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THE PRIVATE MILITARY INDUSTRY: 






Different customers in different ages have used private military members as part 
of their military operations. After the Cold War era, a new form of Private Military 
Industry emerged. Companies serving in both military support and offensive operations, 
and morally and legally questionable military operations in conflict regions raised many 
dilemmas about the industry. Without understanding the economic, legal, ethical and 
contractual dynamics of the industry, there is no simple way of employment of private 
military companies (PMCs) for democratic governments. This study tries to cover these 
dynamics for better use of PMCs, without considering whether they are beneficial or not. 
A better understanding of the industry, governments, international community and other 
prospective legal clients (such as non-for-profit organizations and private firms) can 
produce the necessary outcomes. By using Porter’s “Five Forces analysis,” driving 
factors of industry are analyzed, as are the sub-factors within these areas and the 
competency of some key players. Then, the impacts of PMCs on military operations (i.e., 
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Soldiers for hire have been the part of military operations throughout the ages. 
However, after the end of the Cold War era, the international environment transformed 
and a new form of private military actor, the Private Military Company (PMC) emerged. 
In the realm of the public domain, these new actors now share the established state 
system. While they have many common features with soldiers for hire or mercenaries, 
they are different from old-time mercenaries in the way they operate their businesses. 
Although they are legitimate businesses, their morally and legally questionable 
operations have raised many dilemmas. 
To better understand these considerations, a profound look into the industry is 
required. Although numerous articles have been written and research conducted on the 
industry, most have been generally descriptive studies dealing with its legal aspects. 
Without understanding all the dynamics of the private military industry, any study 
reflecting only one aspect of it would be incomplete. This project covers these dynamics 
mostly from the economic perspective. However, this project covers not only the known 
facts about the private military industry, but also the lack of concepts about the industry 
dynamics. A better understanding of the industry would help governments, the 
international community and other prospective clients produce necessary outcomes while 
using PMCs. To establish a system of understanding of this industry and its implications, 
a focused examination of industrial analysis, Transaction Cost Economics (TCE), 
entrepreneurship, and problematic areas is required.  
Porter’s Five Forces analysis is a helpful tool to see the dynamic relationships 
among industry actors. This analysis shows that there are many more segments or niche 
markets than previously thought. Each segment has its own dynamics, different from the 
others to some extent. As in most industries, the private military industry also has 
business clusters assisting PMCs to enlarge their businesses. In addition, TCE gives a 
new view on the potential uses of PMCs. Any transaction among industry players dealing 
with the integration or outsourcing should consider the transaction costs. Some of the 
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decisions of integration or outsourcing could cause transaction costs burden on the 
player. In addition, according to TCE analysis, many costs inherent to transactions might 
offset the desired cost savings of outsourcing, which restrains the use of PMCs. On the 
other hand, some transaction costs require not using PMCs, such as the use of military 
provider PMCs by state militaries and some international entities.  
The new private military phenomenon appears to be entrepreneurial. Starting 
from the end of the Cold War, many outside events created opportunities for the industry. 
PMCs have also sought innovative functions to diversify themselves from the rest of the 
industry. Whether opportunities are already apparent to PMCs, or they seek new 
opportunities, the security environment still provides a plethora. 
The economic analyses of the industry assert that there are many unexploited 
lucrative areas for PMCs. However, subjects of regulation, ethics, legality, and political 
and social control of force decrease the prospective growth of the industry. These 
subjects are the most mentioned areas of the industry. In fact, even if PMCs are generally 
more effective and less costly, the accountability of PMCs is the major question. In 
addition, the lack of accountability along with regulations, control and transparency of 
PMCs would have a negative impact on human rights and oversight responsibilities. 
Thus, to maintain competition and quality the industry should have clear mechanisms.  
As long as war exists, so will a demand for soldiers for hire. The private military 
industry would continue to benefit from any slack given by traditional forms of security. 
However, its emergence has raised possibilities and questions. The history indicates that 
they will continue to play a significant role in the security environment. Consequently, no 
policy toward the private military industry could be effective without a clear 




I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND  
In 2003, Peter Singer stated that the Private Military Industry had several hundred 
companies, operating in over 100 countries on six continents, and over $100 billion in 
annual global revenue.1 Today, owing to the Iraq war, the industry has grown more than 
any one ever imagined. Military industry is a fact of life; present from ancient times, 
sometimes called mercenaries or condottieri, military industrialists have been there. In 
the last two decades of the last century, this old profession has been transformed into the 
Private Military Company, a legally chartered company or corporation organized along 
business lines and engaged in military operations across the spectrum of conflict.2 This 
professional report explores the dynamics of this industry, including its economic, legal, 
ethical, and entrepreneurial aspects. 
B. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this MBA Professional Report is to give a better understanding of 
Private Military Industry in order for governments, the international community and other 
prospective clients to achieve desired outcomes from the industry. This report gives a 
brief history of the use of private military, analyzes the industry, and gives a brief 
overview of legal and, ethical considerations and entrepreneurial aspects. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This project tries to answer these questions: 
What are the basic economics of Private Military Industry? Are the industry 
economics likely to change? What are some competencies of the industry? 
After answering this question, this project considers the ethical and legal status 
involved with the use of private military and attempts to answer the question: 
                                                 
1  P. W. Singer, Peacekeepers, Inc. Hoover Institute, (2003), 61. 
2  E. B. Smith, The New Condottieri and US Policy: The Privatization of Conflict and its Implications, 
Vol. 32 (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army War College, 2002), 105. 
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What are the ethics of employing PMCs? How might democratic state 
governments employ PMCs ethically?  
Then, this project focuses on the entrepreneurial side of the industry and asks the 
question: 
To what extent is a PMC an entrepreneurial activity? For whom? 
D. METHODOLOGY 
The research methodology of this report consists of four components. First is the 
examination of history concerning private military, including mercenaries, condottieri, 
etc. The second component is an analysis of private military industry by using Porter’s 
“Five Forces analysis,” driving factors of industry and any sub-factors within these areas 
and the competency of some key players. The analysis also includes non-market industry 
analysis. The third component focuses on legal and ethical considerations, expressed by 
the numerous authors and industry experts, and the use of private military companies. 
The last component is an analysis of the entrepreneurship of industry players, including 
governments and other non-profit organizations.  
E. ORGANIZATION 
Chapter I is an overview of this MBA Professional Report and lays out the 
roadmap of the research. 
Chapter II provides a broad overview of the history of private military and gives 
definitions and industry classification that will be used throughout the report. 
Chapter III is an integrated strategy analysis of the industry. The focus of the 
analysis is on Porter’s “Five Forces analysis” as well as non-market components and 
answers the first research question. 
Chapter IV provides a brief overview of the legal and ethical considerations that 
arise with the use of private military and answers the second research question. 
Chapter V examines the use of private military by democratic state governments 
including economic motivations, and the political and military exigencies. 
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Chapter VI answers the third research question by analyzing the entrepreneurial 
approaches of key players in the industry. 
Chapter VII summarizes the findings and presents recommendations for further 
research and study. 
F. BENEFITS OF STUDY 
The primary benefit of this report is to understand the dynamics of Private 
Military Industry. This professional report gathers previous research on the industry into 
a research topic that has not yet been addressed in any body of work to be found. The 
project provides a better understanding of the industry for future researchers as well as 
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II. BACKGROUND OF PRIVATE MILITARY INDUSTRY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Hiring soldiers to fight battles is not a new phenomenon. Until recently, the use of 
hired soldiers drew little attention because it was accepted as normal practice.3 
Throughout the history, “mercenaries” or hired foreign soldiers were the specialized 
individuals or entities in warfare. Many kings and princes, trying to extend their control 
over new lands, used hired soldiers and thus saved themselves from raising larger 
armies.4 Unstable conditions or disorder in a kingdom or state meant prosperity for 
mercenaries, and they found no shortage of work. Whatever the conditions within which 
they prospered, the important motive for mercenaries and other forms of hired soldiers 
was profit. Throughout history, the participants in war were often for-profit private 
entities loyal to no one government.5 According to Peter Singer, one type of these private 
entrants was individual foreigners, brought in to fight for whichever side bid the highest, 
and the second type came in the form of highly organized entities.6   
Their proven success in most cases increased the use of these privatized soldiers 
until the late 1800s, by which time conscript and standing armies had replaced ad hoc 
military formations,7 whereupon states started to be seen as the centers of military power. 
Singer argues that the mass army that began to take the field was both a cause and effect; 
numerical advantage mattered more and helped large armies expand territorially, and this 
expansion required more resources that led to the practice of taxation.8  
 
                                                 
3  D. Shearer, Private Armies and Military Intervention, ed. G. Segal (New York: Oxford University 
Press Inc., 1998), 13. 
4  Smith, The New Condottieri and US Policy: The Privatization of Conflict and its Implications, 105. 
5  P.W. Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry, 19. 
6  Ibid., 19. 
7  Shearer, Private Armies and Military Intervention, 14. 
8  Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry, 30. 
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Although the monopoly of the state over violence has existed during the last two 
centuries, so have hired soldiers. The first form of hired soldiers in the modern state 
system was the charter company, such as the Dutch East India Company and the English 
East India Company, which started to operate in the early 17th century and lasted more 
than two centuries.9 By the twentieth century, state sovereignty became the norm, the 
charter companies were largely gone10 and moral questions surrounding the use of hired 
soldiers began to be asked.  
The second form was the individuals and groups of the decolonization period 
starting from the 1950s and 1960s. Colonial interests, mostly in Africa, funded these 
mercenaries and they were employed in order to assert the newly won independence, to 
maintain control over strategic regions and to destabilize countries regarded as being 
within the sphere of influence of the Soviet Union.11 The use of these military groups 
became a symbol of racism, and further strengthened international opinion against private 
military.12  
The last form of hired soldiers, the Private Military Company (PMC), the 
corporate evolution of the age-old mercenary profession13, emerged in the 1990s. PMCs 
have started to sell their expertise and manpower to those who need it.14 Their emergence 
was driven by three dynamics: the end of Cold War, transformations in the nature of 
warfare, and the trend toward privatization and outsourcing of government functions.15 
Demobilization has released a new labor pool of over 6 million16 former soldiers on to 
the job market; warfare has become more sophisticated due to technological 
                                                 
9  Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry, 34. 
10  Ibid., 37. 
11  X. Renou, “Private Military Companies against Development,” Oxford Development Studies 33, 
no. 1 (2005), 110. 
12  Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry, 37. 
13  P. W. Singer, Outsourcing War, Vol. 84 (Council on Foreign Relations, Inc., 2005), 120. 
14  S. Creehan, Soldiers of Fortune 500: International Mercenaries, Harvard International Review 
Vol. 23, (2002), 6. 
15  Singer, Outsourcing War, 120. 
16  Singer, Peacekeepers, Inc., 61. 
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achievements, and has fallen under the principals of financial management,17 and the 
privatization of nation-state core functions once considered to be basic, such as schools, 
prisons and welfare programs, became the normative way of governing the state.  
B. MERCENARIES IN GENERAL 
The concept of mercenary is itself a major source of dispute and mercenary 
activity has been an illegitimate practice since the late 19th century.18 Webster’s 
Dictionary gives the definition of mercenary as “one that serves merely for wages; 
especially: a soldier hired into foreign service.”19 In his book, after discussing some 
critical facets of the mercenary, Singer gives the following table on the definition of 
mercenary.20 
 
Table 1.   What Makes a Mercenary? (From: Singer, P.W. Corporate Warriors: 
The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry) 
Foreign : A mercenary is not a citizen or resident of the state in which he 
or she is fighting 
Independence : A mercenary is not integrated (for the long term) into any 
national force and is bound only by the contractual ties of a 
limited employee 
Motivation : A mercenary fights for individual short-term economic reward, 
not for political or religious goals 
Recruitment : Mercenaries are brought in by oblique and circuitous ways to 
avoid legal prosecution 
Organization : Mercenary units are temporary and ad-hoc groupings of 
individual soldiers 
Services : Lacking prior organization, mercenaries focus on just combat 
service, for single clients 
                                                 
17  Renou, Private Military Companies against Development, 108. 
18  A. Leander, Eroding State Authority? Private Military Companies and the Legitimate Use of Power 
(Roma: Centro Militare di Studi Strategici, 2006), 66, 
http://se1.isn.ch/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=PublishingHouse&fileid=AADBFBF0-1696-74CC-
A1BD-1FAE43708D62&lng=en (accessed 12/03/2006). 
19  Merriam-Webster's Online Dictionary, http://www.webster.com/dictionary/mercenary (accessed 
11/04/2006). 
20  Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry, 43. 
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Article 47 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions provides 
the most commonly accepted definition of mercenaries. According to Article 47:21  
 
Table 2.   Article 47 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I of the Geneva 
Conventions. (From: Office of the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Human Rights website) 
A mercenary is any person who:  
(a) is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict;  
(b) does, in fact, take a direct part in the hostilities;  
(c) is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for private 
gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a Party to the conflict, material 
compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to combatants of similar 
ranks and functions in the armed forces of that Party;  
(d) is neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor a resident of territory 
controlled by a Party to the conflict;  
(e) is not a member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict; and  
(f) has not been sent by a State which is not a Party to the conflict on official duty 
as a member of its armed forces.  
 
In 1989, the definition of mercenary was broadened in Resolution 44/34 of the 
International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of 






                                                 
21  “International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries,” 
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/mercenaries.htm (accessed 11/15/2006). 
22  “Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection 
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1),” http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/protocol1.htm 
(accessed 11/17/2006). 
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Table 3.   Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 
and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed 
Conflicts (Protocol 1). (From: Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights website) 
1. A mercenary is any person who: 
(a) is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict;  
(b) is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for private 
gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a party to the conflict, material 
compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to combatants of similar 
rank and functions in the armed forces of that party;  
(c) is neither a national of a party to the conflict nor a resident of territory 
controlled by a party to the conflict;  
(d) is not a member of the armed forces of a party to the conflict; and  
(e) has not been sent by a State which is not a party to the conflict on official duty 
as a member of its armed forces.  
2. A mercenary is also any person who, in any other situation:  
(a) is specially recruited locally or abroad for the purpose of participating in a 
concerted act of violence aimed at:  
(i) overthrowing a Government or otherwise undermining the 
constitutional order of a State; or  
(ii) undermining the territorial integrity of a State;  
(b) is motivated to take part therein essentially by the desire for significant private 
gain and is prompted by the promise or payment of material compensation;  
(c) is neither a national nor a resident of the State against which such an act is 
directed;  
(d) has not been sent by a State on official duty; and  
(e) is not a member of the armed forces of the State on whose territory the act is 
undertaken.  
 
Although this is the most widely accepted international definition of a mercenary, 
it is not definitive, because many countries on the globe are not signatories to the 
Additional Protocol. 
In historical context, mercenaries were the private actors in warfare, together with 
other past private military ventures. They came in various sizes, relative power, locations, 
and names. Sometimes they were called free companies, privateers, or chartered 
 12
companies. They were in Egypt, in America and on the high seas, and numbered from a 
few soldiers to sometimes thousands. However, they were always foreign and motivated 
principally by financial gain. By the twentieth century, the state system and the concept 
of state sovereignty weakened the use of mercenaries. As David Shearer notes, “these 
forces were considered legitimate since they were integrated into national armies,” and 
“mercenary activity remained largely peripheral to the strategic interests of the 
superpowers.”23  
Then, in the 1990s, a unique business form that Singer named “privatized military 
firm (PMF)”24 was seen in warfare. These firms25 specialized in providing all types of 
military services, and due to their similarity to mercenaries were widely seen as illegal.  
C. EARLY TIMES OF PRIVATE MILITARY 
1. In Ancient History 
The first official record of mercenary use in warfare is at the Battle of Kadesh 
(1294 BC), fought between Hittites and Egyptians, in which Pharaoh Ramses II 
employed Numidians in his army, and a portion of the Hittite troops, ruled by king 
Muwatallish, was formed of an infantry of mercenaries and vassals.26  
It was also a general practice for ancient Greek city-state armies to form their 
forces by hiring outside specialists, although a few city-states had citizen armies.27 The 
soldiers who fought in long campaigns were the backbone of the economy and needed at 
home, and the use of mercenaries, including fleets, therefore became the practice.28 
                                                 
23  Shearer, Private Armies and Military Intervention, 16. 
24  P. W. Singer, “Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry and its 
Ramifications for International Security,” International Security 26, no. 3 (2001), 186, 
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/international_security/v026/26.3singer.html. (accessed 12/11/2006) 
25 Singer argues that the term “privatized military firm (PMF)” refers the overall industry, whereas the 
term “private military company (PMC) or private security company (PSC)” used by many analysts only 
refers to firms that offer tactical military services. Because it is not the primary aim of this project to 
distinguish such terms, these terms will be used interchangeably. 
26  J. D. Heskett, “The Potential Scope for use of Private Military Companies in Military Operations: 
An Historical and Economical Analysis” (MBA, Naval Postgraduate School), 7. 
27  Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry, 20-21. 
28  Heskett, The Potential Scope for use of Private Military Companies in Military Operations: An 
Historical and Economical Analysis, 8. 
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The Macedonian army under Alexander the Great was primarily made up of hired 
soldiers and a 224-ship fleet contracted from Phoenicians.29 Later, the Carthaginian 
Empire depended heavily on hired soldiers from Spain, Gaul, Italy, Greece, and 
Numidia.30 Although early Rome had a citizen army, as the empire grew it became 
relatively harder to recruit native Romans and mercenaries were hired from the 
economically backward areas of the ancient world. Thenceforth, the imperial army was 
more Germanic than Roman.31   
In his book, Singer gives an example of how the Bible, too, includes instances of 
mercenary use: “The Pharaoh chased the Israelites out of Egypt with an army that 
included hired foreigners, while David and his men (when they were on the run From 
Saul) were employed in the Philistine army of Achish.”32  
When it was hard to maintain regular standing armies, trained soldiers filled the 
gap. These soldiers were an important component of the warring forces and were vital to 
the economies of their families, their tribes or civilizations. As early as the first 
civilizations, hired soldiers organized themselves to gain their livelihoods by marketing 
their relative efficiency in the use of force, locally or in better markets.33  
2.  The Middle Ages 
The system of feudalism developed in Europe after the Roman Empire fell and 
feudal rulers used foreign troops both at home and abroad, up to the limit that they could 
afford. The nature of warfare required quality and skilled soldiers much more than 
before. Rulers, then, began to charge scutagium (shield money, the cost of equipping a  
 
                                                 
29  Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry, 21. 
30  Heskett, The Potential Scope for use of Private Military Companies in Military Operations: An 
Historical and Economical Analysis, 9. 
31  Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry, 21. 
32  Ibid., 20. 
33 P. W. Singer, “Corporate Warriors: The Privatized Military Industry” (PhD, Harvard University), 
39, http://libproxy.nps.navy.mil/login?url=http://proquest.umi.com.libproxy.nps.navy.mil/pqdweb? 
did=726020 761&sid=1&Fmt=2&clientId=11969&RQT=309&VName=PQD  (accessed 11/23/2006). 
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fighting man) and used this money to hire mercenaries.34 Then, every officer, collecting 
recruits for a government and making his living, was an entrepreneur, a businessman 
great or small.35 
By the thirteenth century, urban-based commercial economies caused the 
emergence of trading companies and banking in Europe, both of which put money in 
people’s hand, established a system of money lending and fostered the ‘condotta’ 
(contract) system. By the end of the 14th century, hired soldiers constituted a major trade, 
especially one of the first to establish a European market.36 When contracting out 
military services to private units was seen as reasonable, the most efficient citizens were 
kept from warfare, and a typical soldier was no longer an ordinary citizen.37 
a. Free Companies  
During the unstable period of the Hundred Years War (1337-1453), which 
Singer likens to the post-Cold War era, the absence of centralized control created an 
optimal situation for mercenaries.38 The early European use of organized mercenaries 
was in the form of private organizations, ‘Free Companies’ (vagabond mercenary 
soldiers),39 or ‘Free Lances’ (the origin of the modern business term) that acted as 
corporate entities by hiring themselves out. These evolved from temporary organizations, 
essentially bands of soldiers, into permanent military and economic organizations signing 
agreements, condotta, in a highly detailed fashion.40 Free companies evolved from bands 
of soldiers, looking for employment to protect themselves and localities that paid for their 
service.  
                                                 
34  Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry, 23. 
35  V. G. Kiernan, “Foreign Mercenaries and Absolute Monarchy,” Past and Present, no. 11 (1957), 
77, http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-
2746%28195704%290%3A11%3C66%3AFMAAM%3E2.0.CO%3B2-H (accessed 12/04/2006). 
36  Ibid., 69. 
37  Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry, 22. 
38  Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Privatized Military Industry, 47. 
39  A. Mockler, The New Mercenaries (New York: Paragon House, 1987), 9. 
40  Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry, 24. 
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However, the taking of prisoners for handsome ransoms, and extending of 
battles to lengthen service times caused Machiavelli’s accusation of only fighting 
“bloodless battles.”41 Because there was no employment for these companies whenever 
the fighting stopped, they fought whenever possible. Rulers began to realize the dangers 
of free companies and attempted to wipe them out. For instance, “in 1445 towards the 
end of the Hundred Years War Charles VII took the first step towards a standing army by 
embodying, out of the old feudal mass that had answered the ban and arrière-ban, the 
compagnies d’ordonnance: each company made up of 100 “lances,” units of one heavy-
armed horseman (gendarme) with two or three footmen or mounted infantry.”42  
b. Condottieri 
Italian states, enriched by their trade with the Orient and with an increase 
in allegiance, recruited only native Italians with a contract, or condotta, from mercenary 
captain contractors, or condottieri43 (literally, military contractors) 44, persons who 
offered their services to the highest bidder. In his work, Heskett summarized three basic 
types of condottas. The first one was a Condotta a soldo disteso, a native-born captain 
called for active service; the second one was a Condotta a mezzo soldo, not as strict as the 
first with permission to roam, plunder and raid the enemy’s land for the condottieri; and 
the last one was a Condotta in aspetto, a peace time condottieri paid just to maintain his 
loyalty.45 Each condotta outlined every detail of the contract from duration of service to 
the type of soldiers to be used.  
c. The Swiss and the German Landsknecht 
The poor Swiss forest cantons, starting from their resistance to foreign rule 
in 1291, evolved a highly specialized fighting form, the Swiss pike square, which ended 
                                                 
41  Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry, 25. 
42  Kiernan, Foreign Mercenaries and Absolute Monarchy, 67. 
43  Heskett, The Potential Scope for use of Private Military Companies in Military Operations: An 
Historical and Economical Analysis, 14. 
44  Smith, The New Condottieri and US Policy: The Privatization of Conflict and its Implications, 105. 
45  Heskett, The Potential Scope for use of Private Military Companies in Military Operations: An 
Historical and Economical Analysis, 15. 
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the dominance of the mounted knight on the European battlefield.46 Their effectiveness 
brought renown to these Swiss units, and in 1502, Pope Julius II hired a contingent. This 
unit, the Swiss Guards, serves the Vatican to this day.47 Singer states this “mercenary 
work became something of a national industry for the Swiss.”48  
The success of the Swiss helped new ventures copy and market new units. 
With quite low entry barriers to the market,49 the German landsknechts, foot soldiers of 
the plains,50 emulated their Swiss neighbors; the two groups later became rivals both on 
the battlefield and in the mercenary market. While the Swiss mostly linked with France, 
the landsknechts were found everywhere, due to their internal solidarity, lower cost and 
readiness to take firearms, (i.e., the mounted arquebusier and the Schwartzreiter, a 
mounted pistoleer).51 For the landsknechts, war was purely a business proposition.52 
d. Far East: China, India, and Japan 
Not only Europeans used mercenaries in their battles; the Far East too has 
a rich history of mercenary use, from Chinese Sung dynasty (960-1279) where Huns and 
Mongols were employed53, to the chartered companies of India and to their Japanese 
mercenaries hired in the 1700s.54   
Because the chartered companies were usually formed under the patronage 
of one state that issued its charter, and mostly emerged before and during the standing 
military armies, but lasted nearly more than two centuries, it would be better to include 
these companies in the next section. 
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D. MODERN DAY PRIVATE MILITARY 
1. Standing State Armies 
The emergence of the European state system started after the Peace of Westphalia 
in 1648 when states began to understand the importance of sovereignty. The Napoleonic 
wars at the end of the eighteenth century marked the point where this sovereignty was 
expressed in the replacement of hired armies of foreigners by standing state armies made 
up of citizens.55  
The mercenary trade remained legitimate during the 1700s, when a typical 
European army was a mix of hired soldiers and citizens, although the trends were against 
it. The economically weakest powers, which hired out their own militaries to fight others’ 
wars, like the troops of Hasse-Kassel, (“Hessians”) that the British government hired to 
use over the Atlantic,56 entered the new internationalized military market. On the other 
hand, in the wake of the French Revolution powerful states moved towards a small but 
professional army. France was the first to experiment with a citizen army, Prussia was the 
model for it, and Britain was the last major power to eschew the use of mercenaries.57  
Several forces caused the suppression of mercenaries. Smith lists these factors as 
the inability of states to regulate private military corporations as the concept of 
sovereignty matured; the increased use of more technologically sophisticated weapons 
required dedicated, full-time professionals who were well trained; a degree of discipline 
not found previously in mercenaries; and at the same time, development of the ability to 
recruit, train, pay, and maintain a full-time force by the states.58 Deborah Avant 
articulates two ideational changes with the motif of the Enlightenment: the development 
of the social contract and the prestige of the natural sciences or natural philosophy as a 
new way of thinking about the relationship between states and soldiers.59 Singer adds the 
                                                 
55  Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry, 27. 
56  Ibid., 33. 
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economic rationale behind the decline in use of mercenaries in that the costs of 
disbanding and reenlisting hired forces, and the requirement of numerical advantage on 
the battlefield, meant that the larger state armies could advance quicker and easier than 
mercenary forces.60   
2.  Charter Companies 
While the new state started to rest on a new kind of army, starting from the 1600s 
until the mid-nineteenth century a new military business venture61 emerged mainly 
(though not exclusively) in India. These new ventures were formed by groups of 
European investors to underwrite and profit from the exploration of Africa, India, and the 
Caribbean, and were licensed to have monopoly power over trade within a designated 
area, enabling states to use joint-stock companies for exploration and trade beyond the 
limited resources of their treasury without the uncertainties of engaging in risky, large-
scale activities in distant lands.62  
Carlos and Nicholas relate these trading companies to the modern business 
organizations, “since a hierarchy of salaried managers coordinated the flow of goods, 
services, and information over long distances, and administrative mechanisms were 
designed to extend headquarter control over managers in overseas offices.”63 They also 
argue that although these companies differed in certain characteristics – date of charter, 
size, and location of trade – they were similar business organizations. The seventeenth 
and early eighteenth centuries were periods of experimentation in business form, yet all 
of these companies chose the same methods to lower the costs of doing business 
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internationally, vertical integration to conduct their business rather than through the 
market, and the less costly way of operating by managerial fiat inside the firm.64  
Some renowned chartered companies were “the Muscovy Company, chartered in 
1553 and disbanded in 1746, the East India Company, chartered in 1600 and wound up in 
1858, the Dutch East India Company, chartered in 1602 and dissolved in 1799, the 
Hudson’s Bay Company, chartered in 1670 and still operating, and the Royal African 
Company, chartered in 1672 and disbanded about 1712.”65 
On the other hand, despite the fact that they were under the control of their license 
back home, they acted to protect their own interests by building forts and recruiting 
mercenary armies of their own that dwarfed even the average European state's armed 
forces. They hired a wide variety of troops – e.g., Sepoys, German, and Japanese – by  
the thousands.  Even though military activities were an essential part of doing business to 
improve profits, they engaged in activities that were contrary to their home government’s 
interests, as in the case of the English East India Company’s attack on Portuguese 
garrisons in India despite government orders.66  
3. Twentieth Century Private Military  
By the twentieth century, only a few chartered companies were in the business 
and in control over some locations, such as Nissia and Mozambique Company’s control 
in Mozambique until the 1930s.67 Once the state system and the concept of sovereignty 
spread across the globe, agents who profited from the existence of conflict were 
increasingly seen as contrary to the new order, and their activities as violating the new 
neutrality laws of state; as a consequence, the international trade in military services was 
marginalized and mostly pushed underground.68  
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Thompson states that “[c]ontemporary mercenarism takes one of four forms [in 
the twentieth century]. First, foreigners may be permanently employed, thus constituting 
a portion of the state’s regular army. [That individual and volunteer foreigners 
permanently join without their home state complicities is one variant, and recruitment 
under an interstate treaty or contract between two nations is another]. Third, individual 
foreigners may be hired directly by a state for use in a particular conflict… [and fourth] a 
state may pay a per capita charge for the use of another state’s troops.”69  
The first version is the Foreign Legion, which Mockler defines as “the anarchic 
tradition [that] is combined with the military virtues in war inherited from other strand in 
the mercenary make-up, the Swiss tradition, and with loyalty both to an idea and to a 
direct commander but not to a political leader.”70 The most famous example is the French 
Foreign Legion which was raised by decree in 1831 for the purpose of sending large 
numbers of stateless persons who had started to arrive in France after the Napoleonic 
Wars to fight in Algeria.71 
The best example of the second form is the Nepalese Gurkhas employed by 
Britain, from 1816 with the Treaty of Segauli. In 1947, Gurkha forces divided between 
Britain and India, and continue to serve both countries.72 The interesting fact about the 
Gurkhas is that although they serve only two nations, they have fought in almost every 
major war of the world, on every continent.73 Under the present-day international laws, 
French Foreign Legionnaries and Gurkhas, for example, are not treated as mercenaries 
but are fully integrated soldiers in the militaries of their respective countries. 
Africa has been the site of the most publicized cases of third form ad hoc 
mercenary forces. Singer argues that these ad hoc forces formed by individual ex-soldiers 
                                                 
69  J. E. Thompson, Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns: State-Building and Extraterritorial 
Violence in Early Modern Europe (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994), 89-90. 
70  Mockler, The New Mercenaries, 29. 
71  T. Spicer, An Unorthodox Soldier: Peace and War and the Sandline Affair (Mainstream, 1999), 34. 
72  Thompson, Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns: State-Building and Extraterritorial Violence in 
Early Modern Europe, 90-91. 
73  “Gurkha Manpower Services: About the Gurkhas,” 
http://www.gurkhamanpower.com/gms_aboutthegurkhas.ikml (accessed 12/10/2006). 
 21
“would hire themselves out on an informal basis, usually to rebel groups, or businesses 
operating in weak state zones, such as Latin America, China, and, later, Africa. Many 
were swashbucklers in the mold of a by-gone era, interested more in the adventurer’s 
lifestyle, than in long-term results. As individual operators, few had the capacity to alter 
the final outcome of the battles they fought.”74 In the second half of the century, these 
individuals, for example, were hired by mining firms, (as in Congo’s Katanga secession 
in the 1960s), by rebel groups, (as in the Seychelles or Comoros Islands in the 1970s),75 
or even by federal governments, (as in Nigerian Civil War of 1967-70).76   
The fourth form, reimbursement of a second state for the use of its forces, was 
done by the United States during the Vietnam War. For the use of their troops, the U.S. 
made contracts with South Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines to pay a per diem for 
each soldier plus an additional allowance according to rank. Additionally, the U.S. agreed 
to pay all expenses related to deploying forces.77   
On the whole, in the twentieth century, (excluding the new private military 
industry of the last two decades), hired foreign soldiers continued to be used mostly on an 
ad hoc basis. The main reason behind mercenarism’s persistence in the last century was 
the broken-down governance and legal systems in many areas around the globe. Also, the 
profit motive for the ex-soldier predominated.78  
4.  Private Military Industry 
Towards the end of the twentieth century, an increase in regional and intrastate 
conflicts created many failed or failing states that could not maintain internal order. At 
the same time, fueled by the end of Cold-War confrontations, Western countries were 
more reluctant to intervene militarily in such areas, and politicians were unenthusiastic 
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about explaining casualties to their electorates.79 Also, most Western armies were neither 
trained nor equipped for low-intensity wars. On the other hand, non-state actors having 
the ability to challenge world society began to increase in number, power, and stature. 
When the Cold-War era ended, the United States and the Soviet Union, together with 
their allies, were forced to downsize, and world armies shrank by more than 6 million 
personnel. Meanwhile, most militaries were reliant on off-the-shelf commercial 
technology, by and large maintained and operated by private firms. Finally, the last two 
decades of the century was marked by a normative shift toward the privatization of state 
functions, hand in hand with globalization.80 These two forces caused the increase of 
supply in the global security market, and concomitant with the increase in supply was an 
increase in the demand.81  
Into this niche have stepped private military companies with commercial goals of 
improving their clients’ military capabilities and strengthening their combat performance 
and deterrence capabilities.82 These companies started to provide military and security 
services – including some that have been considered core military capabilities – to states, 
international organizations, NGOs, global corporations, and wealthy individuals. Also, 
changes in the nature of warfare had had brought certain tasks central to the core of 
modern militaries closer to the front and center, and private military companies provided 
these services readily. As a result, a burgeoning transnational market for force emerged 
alongside the system of states and state forces. Since the 11 September terrorist attacks, 
the global war on terrorism has offered even greater opportunities to the industry.83  
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The industry is not an overly capital-intensive sector; barriers to entry are 
relatively low; all necessary tools of the trade are readily available on the open 
international market; and labor input is relatively cheap. Its expansion has been acyclical, 
with revenues continually rising. Similar to Internet firms, most PMCs limit their 
expenditure on fixed assets. The overall number of firms is in the high hundreds, with 
market capitalizations reaching to 20 billion dollars.84 Anna Leander quotes that “The 
annual revenue of the private military industry has increased from $55.6 billion in 1990 
to $100 billion in 2000 and it is expected to double again and reach $202 billion by 
2010.”85 Many of the companies in the industry also have close ties to their home 
governments, because of the business advantages.86 
However, as the industry has emerged, it has raised many problems and questions. 
Some critics argue that this market is the unleashing of another round of mercenaries, 
while others claim that it is the further extension of privatization into the sphere of 
national security.87 Singer gives the following table to show PMCs’ difference from 
mercenaries:88 
Table 4.   How Are PMFs Different? (From: Singer, P.W. Corporate Warriors: 
The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry) 
 
Organization : Prior Corporate Structure 
Motives : Business Profit-Driven, Rather than Individual Profit-Driven 
Open Market : Legal, Public Entities 
Services : Wider Range, Varied Clientele 
Recruitment : Public, Specialized 
Linkages : Ties to Corporate Holdings and Financial Markets 
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Also, a few claim that these companies are “front companies” or covert public 
entities for the reigning world powers rather than private companies.89 These 
considerations of the legitimacy of PMCs will be examined in the fourth chapter. 
E.  PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANY DEFINITION AND PRIVATE 
MILITARY INDUSTRY CLASSIFICATION 
1. Private Military Company Definition 
As discussed previously, a debate exists over the identification of terms among 
Private Military Company (PMC), Privatized Military Firm (PMF), and Private Security 
Company (PSC). The distinction between terms is hard to maintain, though, given the 
variety of services that a company may provide. In order to cover the whole of the 
services given, the definition of Private Military Company (PMC) will be used as a 
common descriptor of these companies.  
Singer defines PMC as the “corporate [body] that specialize in the provision of 
military skills – including tactical combat operations, strategic planning, intelligence 
gathering and analysis, operational support, troop training, and military technical 
assistance.”90 
2. Private Military Industry Classification 
The main reason behind the requirement of an industry classification is that not all 
PMCs in the industry look alike, nor do they serve the same market. One way to 
distinguish firms is by the general level of their activities. Then, some firms are termed 
‘passive’, whereas some others are ‘active’ according to their operations. Another attempt 
has used boundaries drawn from general political science, and the delineating line is 
whether a company is purely international or domestic in its orientation. The third 
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theory (ODT) that questions whether the company’s services bolster or deter 
aggression.91 However, none of the classification attempts adequately covers the PMC’s 
unique business-military cross.  
Peter Singer has given a better classification in his book, “Corporate Warriors: 
The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry.” The classification utilizes the industry 
duality of having both military and economic elements. According to this classification, 
companies are disaggregated according to the relationship between the range of primary 
services and level of force that they are able to offer.92 It uses the “tip of the spear” 
metaphor, an analogy used in military context. This typology distinguishes the units by 
their location on the battlefield, and, then, organizes military companies by the services 
offered by their equivalent military organizations. This categorization allows for useful 
cross-field parallels between military organizations and military companies. Companies 
closest to the tip of the spear, or the actual front line, are called military providers, and 
those far from the tip of the spear are called military support.93 Between them is the 
military consulting firm, which is somewhat unique in the military context; although 
many military units provide training, advisory service by a military organization is 
uncommon.  
Singer further classifies firms into a three-tier model. Type-one firms provide 
implementation and command services on the tactical level. Typical clients of this 
segment are those with comparatively low military capabilities, faced with immediate, 
high-threat situations. Type-two firms offer advice, training, and restructuring of clients’ 
military forces. Their typical client portfolio includes those that require military 
structuring, or an increase in capabilities. Type-three firms provide rear-echelon and 
supplementary services, including non-lethal aid and logistics, intelligence, technical 
support, supply, and transportation assistance. Because their often-mundane operations 
appear less mercenary to the public, they are generally regarded as traditional contractors. 
                                                 
91  Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry, 89-91. 
92  Ibid., 91. 
93  Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry and its Ramifications for 
International Security, 201. 
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However, they fulfill functional needs critical to overall combat operations. The most 
common clients are those engaged in immediate, but long-duration, interventions.94  
F.  CONCLUSION 
The common sense of the controlling, sanctioning, and using of violence would 
seem to require that states avoid using PMCs. Nonetheless, history is full of examples of 
the use of paid foreign forces. The use of hired soldiers, or mercenaries, made sense both 
economically and tactically to rulers who lacked the capability to fight, and those willing 
to pay mercenaries created the demand. Those mercenaries, in turn, offered their war-
fighting skills (the supply) for security. It is clear that as long as there is demand for their 
use, they will provide their services. 
Since states took over the means of violence in the 1600s, military services have 
mostly been kept under the control of the public sector. But, the use of mercenaries has 
not been wiped out completely. The nature of using paid foreign forces has significantly 
changed, especially in the late twentieth century. A new actor, the Private Military 
Company adds to the modern battlefield where individuals, corporations, states, and 
international organizations are supplied not just by public institutions, but also by the 
non-sovereign private market.95  
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III. INDUSTRY ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Although the privatization of modern state force is pervasive, the private military 
industry that emerged after the Cold War has been deemed aggressive in the eyes of the 
international community. Yet to better understand and exploit this industry, to the 
maximum legal and ethical extent, requires a thorough understanding of various aspects. 
To look into the economics of industry is one approach; other approaches would 
investigate legal and ethical considerations, use and oversight of force by democratic 
state governments, and last, but not least (and related to the economic aspect) 
entrepreneurial activities involved in the way of doing business and policy-making. 
Anita McGahan and Michael Porter suggest that industry conditions account for 
approximately 19 percent of a firm’s performance, whereas competitive strategy accounts 
for 32 percent.96 Thus, industry analysis will help companies, researchers, decision-
makers and other interest groups to improve their understanding of this new 
phenomenon.  
Today, the arms and munitions industry, or defense industry, is highly dependent 
on privately held large corporations that design, manufacture, and sell weapon systems to 
the state militaries. Furthermore, emerging technology requires governments and military 
forces to have personnel trained on high-tech weapon systems by these companies, and 
even requires governments to hire specialists to use them. Likewise, most countries 
outsource many of the non-core capabilities to seek efficiency, cost saving, and 
privatization as a requirement of a liberal economy. Deborah Avant argues: 
Private security companies now provide more services and more kinds of 
services including some that have been considered core military 
capabilities in the modern era. Also, changes in the nature of conflicts 
have led tasks less central to the core of modern militaries (such as 
operating complex weapons systems and policing) to be closer to the front 
and center of maintaining security, and private security companies provide 
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these services readily. Furthermore, states are not the only organizations 
that hire security providers. Increasingly transnational non-state actors 
(INGOs, multi-national corporations, and others) are financing security 
services to accomplish their goals. A burgeoning transnational market for 
force now exists alongside the system of states and state forces.97 
In layman’s term, private military industry serves in the domain of public goods. 
However, “the provision of security functions,” Jurgen Brauer claims,  
is not strictly a matter of public versus private provision but a matter of the 
degree of combination. In economist’s jargon, security is a joint product. It 
is not a parameter that is either zero (all public) or one (all private). 
Instead, it is a parameter that ranges between zero and one, each 
community and country choosing its own parameter according to 
idiosyncratic circumstances.98  
Singer quotes,  
in other words, the problem when security is a profit driven exercise is that 
the wealthy are inherently favored. Those portions of society who can 
afford it will employ the best protection, such as that offered by provider 
sector firms. Those who cannot afford the protection are often left behind. 
Not only are the worst threats deflected from the privately protected areas, 
but also those portions of society that cannot afford protection have to rely 
on declining, unstable, or nonexistent public means (whose top personnel 
often shift to the better-paying private side).99 
Due to the various types of operation in which a PMC could be involved, it is 
hard to distinguish where a particular PMC is serving on the continuum of private versus 
public goods. On the other hand, industry structure adds other complexities to the issue, 
such as structural, political, and economical relations and implications within and outside 
the industry.  
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B. MARKET, CLUSTERS, AND MARKET SEGMENTATION 
1. Market 
PMCs are playing increasingly important roles in conflicts. The basic economic 
relationship between supply and demand, as described in the previous chapter, causes this 
increase. Avant argues that on the supply side of the factors are the post Cold-War 
downsizing, reliance on off-the-shelf commercial technology, and the privatization of 
state functions. On the demand side, are countries seeking to upgrade and westernize 
their militaries, rulers of failed or weak states no longer propped up by superpower 
patrons, non-state actors such as private firms, NGOs, different groups in the territories of 
weak and failed states, and of course western countries that are more dependant on 
technology with downsized militaries. Then, Avant adds, “[i]t is often the case PMCs 
started to provide a stop-gap tool for meeting greater demands with smaller forces.”100 
One important point on the growth of demand in the current market is the reluctance of 
western states to intervene in those more numerous outbreaks of violence in conflict 
regions because of basic policy considerations.101 In addition, the poor performance of 
multi-lateral institutions made the private alternatives appear more workable, because of 
prevailing beliefs about anything private being cheaper and better.102  
Most of the companies in the industry operate as ‘virtual companies’, similar to e-
commerce firms. These companies do not maintain large number of permanent 
employees and other fixed assets, but rather use databases of qualified personnel and 
specialized subcontractors.103 Avant adds, “[m]ost PSCs operate as databases from which 
to service contracts and these databases are non-exclusive (individuals often show up on  
 
 
the rosters of several different companies).”104 Additionally, because they are service 
                                                 
100  Avant, The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security, 30-31,36. 
101  Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry, 58. 
102  Avant, The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security, 38. 
103  Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry, 75. 
104  Avant, The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security, 222. 
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oriented, globally operating companies, they have the ability to move across borders to 
new countries or transform themselves into new companies, whenever and wherever they 
choose.105  
In most cases, their operations are contentious and secrecy is often the norm. 
Even though many have corporate websites to present a positive public image and are 
seemingly quite transparent, many others try to cover up the scope of their activities by 
stating proprietary information reasons.106  
Market mechanisms of the private military industry work differently than the 
hierarchical industries, because its characteristics combined with global forces let it 
change the military norms and there is nothing to prevent a state (as well as any other 
entity) from being a buyer if it so desires.107 Furthermore, large customers such as the 
United States and United Kingdom (UK) play significant roles in terms of market 
expansion and supply and demand, and have the ability to affect the market to make their 
wishes and policies be more fruitful. In addition, companies from these two countries 
dominate the market. Although their activities appear to be independent commercial 
enterprises, few of them act outside the national interests of their home states.108  
The ICIJ (International Consortium of Investigative Journalists) states that 
between 1994 and 2003, the US Department of Defense entered into 3,061 contracts with 
12 of the 24 US-based PMCs. These contracts were valued at more than $300 billion and 
just two companies held more than 2,700 of those contracts.109 
2.  Clusters 
Deborah Avant lists PMCs (Appendix A) according to the services they provide 
and the countries from which their employees are generally drawn.110 The ICIJ gives 
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another list of PMCs (Appendix B).111 Although lists do include defunct companies and 
do not consider the South African government’s regulation on mercenary activities112, it 
is clear that the United States and UK are the geographical regions of concentration. 
Based on the information given in the SourceWatch Website113 (a project of the Center 
for Media and Democracy to produce a directory of the people, organizations and issues 
shaping the public agenda) at least 16 of the total 74 companies have headquarters or 
offices in London, whereas 15 of them are based in and around Washington D.C. (e.g., in 
Alexandria, Fairfax, and Arlington). PMCs, especially those in the US and UK, are close 
to the information sources in capital cities, to think tanks, and to standards-setting 
agencies. London is one of the unofficial centers of the industry,114 while Washington 
D.C. is home to the association of PMCs, the International Peace Operations Association.  
As the lists are arranged according to the countries in which companies are based 
or from which employees are drawn, they illustrate the existence of business clusters115 
in the industry. Clusters, often for economic and political reasons, include 
complementary product/service suppliers (a case that will be discussed in the third and 
fourth sections) and include other institutions, such as governmental bodies, international 
organizations, and trade associations. They have many benefits; Porter suggests that 
“cluster advantages rest on information, transaction costs, [and] complementaries…,”116 
and “the proximity of companies and institutions in one location – and the repeated 
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exchanges among them – fosters better coordination and trust.”117 Companies in these 
clusters have the advantage of agglomeration economies, such as direct observation of 
others and ability to exploit collective knowledge, and network-based effects, especially 
enhanced social interaction. They have better access to information than do other firms, 
resulting from both direct cluster effects as well as network process underlying the 
clusters.118  
Porter argues that clusters provide a new way of thinking about the economy, a 
means for bringing together firms and institutions and identifying the impediments and 
constraints.119 That this is a new way of thinking about the economy or the industry (in 
how PMCs find new administrative systems or develop new services) is clear. PMCs in 
such clusters are likely to be more innovative than others would be. Because of the 
proximity and centrality (measurement of the involvement in the network and deep 
involvement in network relations) they could have more common knowledge, common 
background and understanding than others, be better positioned to access the information, 
and have the chance of direct observation of others in order to compete and imitate.120  
Clusters affect competition by increasing the productivity of companies based in 
the area, by driving the direction and pace of innovation, and by stimulating the 
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a.  Cluster Productivity 
Being part of a cluster lets PMCs operate more productively in sourcing 
inputs (especially manpower), accessing information and needed institutions (national, 
international and business related), and coordinating with related companies, especially 
when subcontracting large agreements.122 Each of these is discussed below: 
(1) Better Access to Employees and Suppliers. PMCs maintain 
close contact with each other and even use the same databases. Their executives also 
maintain contact with former colleagues still working in the public service; in turn these 
relations provide a steady flow of business recommendations and information123  and the 
ability to tap into an existing pool of former military personnel, and by this means lower 
PMCs’ search and transaction costs. 
(2) Access to Specialized Information. Clusters accumulate 
extensive market, technical, and competitive information, and it is easy to facilitate 
information flow and to foster trust due to personal relationships.124 Being the largest 
buyers from the industry, the US and UK clusters reduce the principal-agent problems in 
contracts by approximating the parties’ interests. Furthermore, the need for technical 
expertise to stay at the leading edge of military capabilities, and the asymmetric warfare 
requirements, entail a greater dependence on private sources. Institutions (i.e., 
government agencies, embassies, political science research centers, or other military 
related companies) and PMCs in these clusters might share information that is not readily 
available to others.  
(3) Complementaries. “For the most part, PMFs tend to hire former 
personnel of national militaries [and police forces],”125 and these ex-military personnel 
constitute the basic complement for the industry; that is, any buyer using or purchasing a 
PMC service generally benefits from the experience of the people who have exited the 
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military service. Companies can boost industry demand by including with their services 
complementary products/services, as with cameras and film, razors and blades, and 
laboratory instruments and consumable supplies.126 Similarly, PMCs leverage their 
services with their ex-military personnel. Companies in these clusters, due to the 
proximity to national military headquarters, can easily reach former personnel, or ex-
military personnel in the company can lure their former colleagues still in public service, 
who, in many cases, are their former subordinates, to work for a PMC. 
(4) Access to Institutions. Things like recruiting personnel trained 
in national militaries by luring when they are still in service or training programs in trade 
associations lower the cost of internal training and contribute to collective benefits in 
clusters. Serving in a publicly dominated market, security issues necessitate that PMCs 
maintain close relationships with national governments, international institutions, 
political science research centers, and think tanks. 
b. Cluster Innovation 
“Because,” Porter articulates, “sophisticated buyers are often part of a 
cluster, companies inside clusters usually have a better window on the market than 
isolated competitors do.”127 For example, MPRI’s (Military Professional Resources 
Incorporated) employee pool draws from the highest levels of retired US military 
personnel. In its office located a short distance from Pentagon, MPRI has a carefully 
managed database of former military personnel -- as of 2002 over 12,000 -- from among 
whom the company can replicate every single military skill, and its close ties with its 
home government, due to its personnel structure, gives MPRI a decided advantage over 
corporate rivals.128 Other innovations in the industry, including some not directly related 
to clustering, can be found in Chapter VI.  
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c. New Business Formation 
Many new companies grow up within a cluster. Based on the information 
given in the SourceWatch Website,129 at least four companies were founded or opened 
offices in London during the 1990s, and four more after 2000. In the Washington D.C. 
cluster, four PMCs were founded or opened new offices during the last decade. New 
companies founded in clusters are the result of several factors. First, individuals working 
in the cluster can easily perceive gaps or niches within markets. Second, as monetary 
barriers to entry into private military industry are very low around the globe, it is also 
easy to enter into the industry once a couple of companies have established a good public 
image and familiarized different shareholders. Finally, clusters present a significant 
market in which new companies benefit from already established relationships.130 
3. Market Segmentation 
Private military industry is a market in which many similar or closely related 
services, different forms of security, are sold to buyers. In this industry, although the 
varieties of service being sold are similar to some extent, the buyers are usually not alike. 
In theory, every buyer overlapping with a service variety forms an industry segment, 
“because,” Porter states, “the five forces or the value chain [are] somehow different for 
each… In practice, however, product [service] varieties and buyers should be grouped 
into categories that reflect their important differences.”131  
The service varieties include: military operations at the forefront of the 
battlespace served by military provider firms; military consulting offering strategic, 
operational, and/or organizational analysis and training supplied by military consulting 
firms; and supplementary military functions including non-lethal aid and assistance, such 
as logistics, intelligence, technical support, supply, and transportation provided by 
military support firms.132  
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Buyers, on the other hand, can be individuals (such as a businessman held hostage 
in East Timor for $200,000 in ransom and then rescued by Onix International, a firm 
made up of ex-New Zealand SAS soldiers133, or Afghanistan President Hamid Karzai’s 
protection provided by Virginia-based contractor DynCorp International).134 
Alternatively, it can be private firms (such as British Petroleum (BP), which hired DSL 
(Defense Systems Limited, a.k.a. ArmorGroup) in 1997 to ensure the protection of its 
pipelines in Columbia).135  
Another buyer category is non-state entities. Singer quotes from Anna Leander, 
“Worldvision in Sierra Leone and UNHCR (United Nations High Commission for 
Refugees) on the Afghanistan border, have hired PMFs for protection and security 
advisory.”136 States also employ PMCs in various ways. First, they can hire a PMC as an 
interim solution to immediate dangers, for example, EO (Executive Outcomes) was 
generally credited with stopping at least two coup attempts against the Sierra Leone 
government.137 Second, to lessen the effects of downsizing a PMC can be employed 
(e.g., MPRI’s work for the US Army in the process of privatizing the Reserve Officer 
Training Corps [ROTC]). Third, to westernize their militaries (e.g., MPRI’s training of 
the Croatia and Bosnia Federation’s military),138 and to meet the need for specialized 
expertise in advanced technology weapon systems, or for mundane non-core military 
activities, states can use PMCs. Public agencies other than military forces employ PMCs, 
too. One example, perhaps the most tragic one, is the Aviation Development Corporation 
(ADC), hired by the CIA for its surveillance plane. In one mishap, ADC employees 
conducting counter narcotics operations in Peru mistakenly shot down a private 
passenger plane carrying a family of missionaries rather than drug runners.139  
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Although PMCs are legitimate, long-term corporate entities, some firms could 
engage with rebel groups and drug cartels. Spearhead Limited, an Israeli company, “is 
reputed to have provided military assistance to the forces of Colombian drug lords Pablo 
Escobar and Jose Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha, two of the Medellin cartel’s most violent 
bosses.”140  
Figure 1 gives the array of abovementioned services and buyers.141 This figure is 
a blend of Singer’s industry classification and Avant’s contract-based142 service 
description to illustrate how the industry can have a wide spectrum of buyers and 
services.  
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Figure 1.   Private Military Industry as an Array of Services and Buyers (After: 
Porter, M. E., Competitive Advantage; Service Varieties from Singer, 
P.W., Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military 
Industry and Avant, D.D., The Market for Force: The Consequences 
of Privatizing Security) 
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Even though this broad segmentation shows many industry segments, a couple of 
different but industry-inherent features add to the complexity of segmentation. For 
example, the use of a native PMC in a different country from the buyer’s or a foreign 
company used in a third country entails adding two new distinctive dimensions to the 
figure. The first dimension is the market from which a PMC is hired, and the second is 
the area of use in which a hired company is employed, or its direct participation in 
military operations in the context of international or internal armed conflicts. Figure 2 
furthers the basic segmentation by including these two dimensions.143 
To simplify, only three broad segments -- military provider, military consulting, 
and military support segments -- will be used to analyze the economics of the industry 
without considering where a PMC is hired and in which area it is used. While bearing in 
mind the use of PMCs in legal and ethical use for state governments, these segments will 
be included in consideration.  
                                                 
143 In Figure 2, (X) refers to any actual segment or a segment that might have been filled in but none 
of the references hold information on that. On the other hand, (N) refers to ‘null’ segments that are not 
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Figure 2.   Private Military Industry Segmentation 
 
C. ANALYSIS OF MILITARY PROVIDER SEGMENT 
The military provider segment is unique compared to other segments. Even 
though there are copious news stories, articles, and books written about the ‘mercenary’ 
companies of this segment, most of the information relates to how they do their business, 
not how they manage it. There are three reasons that the information about the military 
provider segment is very limited. First, the nature of the business in most cases requires 
buyers and PMCs to operate covertly. Second, the two most famous companies, EO 
(Executive Outcomes) and Sandline are now defunct.144 Third, none of the existing 
companies admit to having served in the segment. Therefore, the analysis will be based 
on historical information of these two companies: EO (Executive Outcomes), a South  
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African firm disbanded in 1999, and Sandline International, which was registered in the 
Bahamas, but had offices in London and Washington, D.C. Figures 3 and 4 summarize 
the scope of their operations when they were active in the 1990s.145 
 
Figure 3.   Executive Outcomes Contract Operations 1989-1999 (From: 
Goddard, S.C., The Private Military Company: A Legitimate 
International Entity within Modern Conflict adapted from Abdel-
Fatau Musah, Mercenaries: An African Security Dilemma) 
 
 
Figure 4.   Sandline International Foreign Military Contracts (From: Goddard, 
S.C., The Private Military Company: A Legitimate International 
Entity within Modern Conflict) 
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The need to understand an industry’s situation is to relate a company to its 
environment. The relevant environment can be very broad, including all facets of social 
and economic dynamics, yet the key characteristic is the industry in which it competes. 
Forces outside the industry, bargaining power of buyers and suppliers, rivalry among 
existing companies, substitutes, and potential entrants, are significant because of the 
ability to affect all firms in the industry.146  
Although Avant argues that many companies offer armed operational support for 
their clients,147 her contract-based assessment does not support the industry segmentation 
mentioned previously. Thus, it would be better to include them as sub-segments to the 
military support segment. 
Figure 5 gives the military provider segment in terms of a Five Forces analysis, as 
outlined by Porter.148 This analysis is so important that a decent strategic analysis would 
fail if it did not consider customers, suppliers, rivals, new entrants, and substitutes. 
Although ‘complement’ is not a part of the framework, its importance requires including 
it in the analysis. Complementary products are those used jointly with their product by 
the buyer and they represent interrelatedness among industries.149 As noted previously, 
this analysis is performed in the context of the 1990s, when both Executive Outcomes 
and Sandline were the dominant firms. Dark arrows in this diagram (also in the following 
sections) summarize the relative influence of each of the five forces, with an upward 
arrow being higher and a downward arrow being lower. 
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Figure 5.   Five Forces Analysis of the Military Provider Segment (After: Porter, 
M.E., Competitive Strategy: Techniques for Analyzing Industries and 
Competitors) 
 
1. Rivalry among Existing Competitors 
In any industry or industry segment, rivalry is the result of competitors’ pressure 
or the opportunity to improve one’s position. It is hard to tell these two firms were in 
competition with one another. Sandline once delivered some troops to Papua New Guinea 
who were later discovered to be employees of Executives Outcome, which was 
subcontracted due to the lack of immediate manpower. Furthermore, Executive Outcomes 
was claimed to be under the umbrella of Branch-Heritage Group, a financial holding 
registered in London and parent company of Sandline, or to have executives associated 
with that group.150 However, “Proof of formal corporate links between Branch-Heritage 
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and EO, if it exists, is buried in offshore company registration offices.”151 Nevertheless, 
some other factors are still relevant and this close involvement diminishes the rivalry 
between the two companies.  
Because the segment had had two equally balanced companies, there was little 
relative strength to dominate the market. Both companies had less regard for their 
corporate image and easily involved themselves with some of the most unseemly regimes 
of the 1990s.152 Many buyers with limited ability to choose from existing companies 
required their services. The segment’s growth rate was high, which in turn reduced the 
rivalry. Similar to other companies in the whole industry, EO and Sandline had neither 
high fixed costs nor a high exit barrier. For example, “The only constantly employed unit 
was at the Pretoria [South Africa] headquarters that served as a command center and kept 
a 24-hour radio watch. EO maintained no standing force in the barracks, but rather kept a 
database of immediately available personnel.”153 Their basic investment in human 
resources was the upkeep of relevant skills in their databases in order to use specific 
skills in their operations. 
The overall rivalry among existing competitors was very low, a situation that may 
continue even if any company admits to operate overtly in the segment or if their 
operations come to be considered legal.  
2.  Threat of New Entry 
Porter describes the threat of new entry to the segment under several factors: 
barriers to entry, expected retaliation, entry deterring price and experience and scale as an 
entry barrier.154 Most of the factors are not applicable to the military provider segment. 
However, both firms’ differentiation in their services, such as brand identification and 
customer loyalty, possibly deterred any new entrant or other PMCs of general similarity. 
It is a fact that that some customers, like Angola and Sierra Leone, hired Executive 
Outcomes more than once. Also, Executives Outcomes was the most notorious, but also 
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the most effective, member of the segment in which it organized and completed its 
contracts.155 The veterans of militaries were the base of the companies’ pool of 
personnel. That these personnel put their skills and experiences, which they earned in 
military service, into the fulfillment of the contracts constituted an entry barrier.  
However, different from Porter’s suggestions, the main impediment for a 
prospective company willing to enter into the segment is the lack of legal regulation. 
Thus, without any regulation, the threat of a new entry in the provider segment was low 
as such in the 1990s, and may remain the same today. 
3.  Bargaining Power of Customers 
Buyers are supposed to compete with any industry by forcing down prices, 
bargaining for better service, and playing competitors against each other.156 However, 
this is not the case in the military provider segment. Singer depicts this circumstance as 
follows:  
Violence breaks out in a small African state. The local government 
collapses and reports emerge that civilians are being massacred by the tens 
of thousands. Refugees stream out in pitiable columns. As scenes 
reminiscent of the Rwanda genocide are played out on the world’s 
television screens once again, pressure mounts to do something. The 
U.N.’s calls for action fall on deaf ears. In the U.S. the leadership remains 
busy with the war on terrorism and Iraq and decides that the political risks 
of doing nothing are far lower than the risks of losing any American 
soldiers’ lives in what is essentially a mission of charity. Other nations 
follow its lead, and none are willing to risk their own troops. As the 
international community dithers, innocent men, women, and children die 
by the hour. It is at this point that a private company steps forward with a 
novel offer. Using its own hired troops, the firm will establish protected 
safe havens where civilians can take refugee and receive assistance from 
international agencies. Thousands of lives might be saved. All the 
company asks is a check of $150 million.157 
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Whereupon, he continues, the client will accept the offer (having few other 
options) and simply write the check (typically without any or at least any fruitful 
negotiation).158 A similar desperate case happened in Papua New Guinea in 1997, when 
the country could not find any outside aid from its allies; its government hired Sandline 
International to reestablish control over Bougainville, an island holding the country’s 
primary export, copper.159 
None of the circumstances, which Porter described in his book, fully hold true for 
buyers for better positioning as a powerful group in this segment.160 Buyers in this 
segment could not establish a concentrated, large-volume purchase, pose a credible 
backward integration (the reason they buy service from a PMC is that they lack the 
capability to use their own forces), or have enough information about the market (even 
the possible cost of an international relief force intervention). Almost certainly, the 
service they needed would not be a small portion of their purchase, to establish 
bargaining leverage. Furthermore, according to Singer, “Businesses [PMCs] often make 
their estimates of how much to charge public agents not by their estimate of intrinsic 
costs, but by how much they believe they can get away with.”161 Altogether, the 
bargaining power of buyers in this segment has been almost nonexistent, and seems 
poised to stay the same in the future if PMCs start to operate and/or allies of buyers’ or 
the U.N. are unwilling to intervene. 
4.  Bargaining Power of Suppliers 
It is remarkable that the non-material supplier of the industry is the public military 
or police force of any one country. The material suppliers of the segment are the 
international arms dealers and PMCs of other segments. In the downsizing era of the 
1990s, private military industry (and its segments) easily picked and chose many of the 
best and brightest away from state militaries.162 On the other hand, after 1989, much of 
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the old Soviet weaponry was declared surplus and ended up in the hands of arms brokers 
and gunrunners. Most of the weapons used in operations came from the international 
arms dealers who bought directly from Russia or its satellite states that had disappeared 
or downsized or reconfigured their militaries to meet Western standards163; the dealers 
then transferred those weapons to private military companies. “Any tools of the trade 
(typically weapons systems and other military equipment) are not held in stock but rather 
are bought or leased rapidly from the international market, also on a case-by-case basis. 
Such global resource allocation builds greater competence in contracting with less 
operational slack.”164 For example, first Executives Outcomes and then Sandline hired 
helicopter gunships for the Sierra Leone government from the market.165 It was also 
claimed that Ibis Air, a firm owned by Branch-Heritage Group owner of Sandline, had 
the capability to lease and operate any type of combat aircraft available on the world 
market.166  
In the case of public security forces, due to downsizing none of the states had any 
bargaining power over the companies for their ex-military personnel. Similarly, the 
existence of so many international arms dealers created a less concentrated market to 
exert a bargaining power over companies. However, PMCs were not the only customers 
for arms dealers, who could also sell their goods to terrorist groups, drug cartels, and 
even to Third World countries. Therefore, the bargaining power of international arms 
dealers was moderate. On the other hand, PMCs found innovative solutions to lower the 
bargaining power of arms dealer. “Many contracts are designed so that the client is 
responsible for providing the weapons or other logistical needs of the firm; the PMF just 
supplies the personnel. If this is not the case, a number of firms have been able to make  
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gains by handling the purchasing on behalf of the client, for an added charge.”167 When 
all factors are considered, the overall bargaining power of suppliers in the segment is 
probably low. 
5.  Threat of Substitutes 
The first and foremost substitute for a military provider segment should be the 
countries’ own national security forces. Yet, many clients do not have such a force or the 
force is deficient, necessitating their employment of PMCs. Thus, a national force is often 
an ineffective substitute. Many treaties and multi-national organizations among countries 
were the substitutes for the segment in the 1990s. The most important one was the UN, 
which many times used ad hoc military forces in conflict regions. Others were ad hoc 
peacekeeping coalitions established by a wide variety of countries or mostly regional 
standing unions -- for example, the African Union (AU), a treaty organization that helped 
to police the many problem areas of Africa with African national militaries, or the 
European Union, which also had a quasi-military (police) force that deployed to the 
Balkans. The ability for one of the alliances to enter a region militarily with international 
consent could be seen as a threat to substitution by a military provider PMC.  
However, the tremendous effort required to intervene in a conflict region often 
requires a substantial change in nations’ governmental will or policy to decide on such an 
operation. Thus, the capability of many alliances’ nations to get to a crisis in good time 
and in good order is seriously lacking. Consequently, “Many PMCs were proud of 
themselves on the speed of their responses that became one of the key benchmarks in the 
industry.”168  
As Singer argues,  
[s]ometimes, coalitions can be built to respond to crises, but they require 
time, cohesion, and a willingness and capability to intervene that may not 
always be there. Thus, when state failure or chaos occurs, often no one  
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answers the call. Even when peacekeeping forces are available, the units 
are often slow and cumbersome to deploy, poorly trained, under-equipped, 
lacking in motivation, or operating under a flawed mandate.169  
This was more obvious in UN operations as Richard Wallwork quoted from 
Robert Kaplan that “the world’s most efficient peace keeping force belongs not to the UN 
or even to the great powers but to … Executive Outcomes.”170 
Furthermore, the price performance of the potential substitutes was not attractive, 
even though the client in a peacekeeping operation did not pay the costs. “The Financial 
Times suggests that Executive Outcomes (EO) had running costs at 4 percent those of the 
United Nations (UN) and their contract with the government of Valentine Strasser in 
Sierra Leone cost between $35 million and $60 million. The UN had operating costs of 
$607 million a year.”171  
It is clear that the UN, other alliances and ad hoc coalitions did not pose a threat 
to military provider PMCs, at least at the beginning when the urgency was high. Thus, the 
threat of substitutes in this segment was very low. 
6. Complements 
The typical employees of the segment, retired military members who were 
relatively cheap labor and readily available were the complement of the military provider 
PMCs. For example, by using ex-military personnel Executives Outcomes “ensured 
common training, a pre-existing hierarchy, and extensive combat experience in low 
intensity conflict and counter-insurgency operations. The company proudly advertised 
that it had over 5000 years of combat experience, far more than most armies can claim.” 
As Porter suggests, one complementary product (ex-military) affected the military 
provider PMCs’ market image and service quality, as well as the cost of using high 
combat experience from the buyer’s viewpoint.172  
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Singer states,  
That almost everyone in the industry is an “ex-something” has a twofold 
advantage. The costs of training and evaluation have been accrued 
elsewhere at the state's expense rather than that of the firm, which now 
benefits from them. This means that the cost of investment in employees' 
skills, including the most specialized of military proficiencies that took 
years and tens of thousands of dollars of public spending to develop, is 
almost negligible for the PMF, This is a huge comparative advantage in 
relation to public agents. As far as ongoing human investment, the firm 
must typically only invest in the upkeep of relevant skills and how best to 
harness them inside the organization.173 
Another form of complementaries is the coordination of activities across 
companies to optimize their collective productivity.174 The employee pools of companies 
were non-exclusive databases; for example, Sandline used or shared the employees of 
Executives Outcomes in its operation.175 Thus, while Sandline could redeem its contract, 
by hiring its employees, Executives Outcome would benefit from the success of the 
operation as a marketing tool.  
D. ANALYSIS OF MILITARY CONSULTING SEGMENT 
This segment is unique in the way PMCs have been used. These companies are 
seen as an effective yet secure way of providing appropriate training and advice where 
national military forces are lacking.176 In addition, their involvement helps the home 
government to facilitate foreign policy by proxy, allowing the government to change 
events on the ground and to maintain its long-term interests, but at a distance that allows 
for plausible deniability.177 “Outsourcing of foreign military policy to military advisory 
and training companies appears to mark a trend led by the United States which gained 
momentum after the end of the Cold War. For the time being this market segment is not 
fully open to international competition. MPRI, Vinnell, and DynCorp are among the 
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leading American contenders.”178 David Shearer explains their primary focus as 
exploiting domestic defense-market opportunities, while conducting international 
contracts that stemmed from their existing business relationships.179  
Although one of the main functions of these companies is strategic consulting and 
advice, the biggest growth area has been in providing military training. During the 1990s, 
U.S. private firms trained militaries in more than 42 countries.180 For instance:  
• Hungary hired Cubic to help it restructure its military to comply with 
NATO standards, 
• Croatia and Bosnia each hired Military Professional Resources 
Incorporated (MPRI) to help professionalize, train, and equip their armed 
forces in 1995, 
• The U.S. has hired MPRI, DynCorp, and other PMCs for military training 
and other drug war missions in Colombia, 
• The State Department and Pentagon have outsourced portions of military 
training in Africa to SAIC, MPRI, DFI International, Logicon, and other 
U.S. companies. 
MPRI is the prime example in that it served many segments described in Figure 2. 
For example, it was hired by its own government agencies to be used in its own country, 
by foreign governments to train personnel on the buyers’ soil, and by its own government 
to be used in another country. This practice complicates the analyses, whether economic 
or regulatory. 
Singer estimates that there are about 250 firms (presumably some are not PMCs, 
but corporate training/consulting companies) in the US military training market, led by 
Lockheed Martin with a market share at 18 per cent, L3/MPRI at 10 per cent, and CAE 
Electronics at 8 per cent.181 
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Figure 6 depicts the Five Forces analysis of the military consulting segment. As in 
the previous analysis, the dark arrows in the diagram summarize the relative influence of 
each of the five forces, with an upward arrow being higher, a downward arrow being 
lower, and a dark line being a moderate position. 
 
 
Figure 6.   Five Forces Analysis of the Military Consulting Segment (After: 
Porter, M.E., Competitive Strategy: Techniques for Analyzing 
Industries and Competitors) 
 
 
1. Rivalry among Existing Competitors 
Even though there are many companies serving in this segment, the market is far 
from saturated. For instance, between 1997 and 2000, the three market leaders, although 
they grew their businesses, lost 8 per cent of their market share.182  
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One of the specific example of rivalry happened in 2002 when the US Army 
ROTC (Reserve Officers Training Corps) program was re-competed, and the incumbent 
company MPRI lost the contract to COMTek (Communication Technology) on cost 
concerns.183 Although this and the existence of numerous companies suggest that the 
rivalry is high in national market, in fact the global market is where they compete. The 
likelihood is that as developing countries’ economies expand or their security needs 
grow, and their desire to westernize their militaries increases, the rivalry in the segment 
will be higher. Therefore, the overall rivalry among existing companies can be concluded 
to be high. 
2.  Threat of New Entry 
As many firms respond to the marketplace’s demand, a rapid consolidation of the 
segment into diversified firms, mostly transnational, is taking place. They are either 
partnering with equals or acquiring smaller participants with niche market and 
technologic specializations to compete on the global scene. Broader firms, having social 
capital and established brands, could increase their market share to the detriment of 
smaller specialized or local firms.184  
The merger of the British firm Defense Service Limited with Armor 
Holdings exemplifies the trend towards consolidation and diversification. 
Utilizing primarily ex-SAS personnel, DSL originally offered security 
training and consultation to governments and MNCs [Multi-National 
Companies] operating in conflict zones. … In turn, Armor Holdings, an 
American-based firm that started out in the body armor business, acquired 
DSL in 1996. Intent on building up its “risk management services,” with a 
growth through acquisitions-strategy, it created the new Armorgroup 
division, with DSL at its core.185  
These types of merger and acquisitions suggest that the industry and its segments 
become no different from any other industry type.186  
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On the other hand, the success and the profitability of MPRI seems to have been 
recognized by other firms. L-3, a spin-off from Loral and Lockheed, acquired MPRI and 
is now a part of a consortium that trades on the stock market. This ‘added stamp of 
legitimacy’ provides MPRI additional areas of profitability.187 Greater legality and profit 
margins lure many startups and PMCs from other segments into the consulting segment. 
For example, Sandline transformed itself into a consulting company.188 However, with 
the extent of the segment being so large that a local small firm could find a niche, the 
new entrants do not diminish existing firms’ status considerably. Thus, the threat of new 
entry is low in the military consulting segment. 
3.  Bargaining Power of Customers 
In some cases, the customers hire consulting PMCs when they have a great 
urgency, as in Croatia and Bosnia. This diminishes their bargaining power. On the other 
hand, whether the customer is a national or an international entity, because of the 
possibility of further contracts down the road, many firms are motivated to make 
recommendations that steer follow-on business their own way. Furthermore, the client 
can become increasingly constrained in its own decision making process, simply by 
relinquishing own tasks, and can turn out to be more reliant on the firm’s expertise. As 
the client’s dependence on the firm grows, it will be less able to bargain.189 The latter 
point is similar to the bargaining power of customers who use military support segment. 
When a third party, other than the ones who either provide or receive the service 
(such as hiring of MPRI by the US for drug war missions in Columbia) uses a PMC, the 
buyer can have bargaining power. In this case, it can be said that the bargaining power of 
the customer is high; however, these cases occur when the third party has no other 
possible ways to deal with the situation with its own capabilities. Then, it uses PMCs as a 
tool of foreign policy by proxy, which diminishes its bargaining power with the company 
to a moderate degree. 
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4.  Bargaining Power of Suppliers 
When the supplier is also a customer of the military consulting PMC, such as the 
US and its Army ROTC program, it can exert some bargaining power to a certain degree; 
otherwise, it will be very low.  
After the Cold-War era, emerging industry created a demand for well-trained 
personnel and the downsizing of militaries met this demand. However, in the last decade, 
governments have understood the potential risks of losing well-trained personnel to 
higher-paying PMCs, and have attempted to prevent the damage caused by the drain.190 
(This issue will be discussed broadly in the next section). If the state governments 
prevent their retired personnel from working for a PMC or formulate new pay, benefits, 
and educational incentives to retain their personnel, the bargaining power of the supplier 
can be moderate or high. As a supplier, by squeezing the employee pool of the PMCs, the 
state government can exercise bargaining power, but it seems highly unlikely that the 
state governments can achieve this.  
On the other hand, the suppliers pose a credible threat of forward integration that 
most of the customers already have. But, because either the customers are lacking the 
capability, as in weak or developing states, or the customers desire to shift activities from 
in-house (or from the public) to the private sector for a couple of reasons, their bargaining 
power seems low.  
The PMCs in training use military-specific hardware of all sorts. Sometimes the 
customer supplies most of this; other times the requirement is that the PMC to acquire it 
on the open market. Together with this, the overall bargaining power of all suppliers is 
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5.  Threat of Substitutes 
Substitutes in this segment are similar to those in the military provider 
segment.191 For the same reasons, the threat of substitutes is low. However, this segment 
has a different customer profile than the military provider segment, although the two 
segments are almost the same. For a MNC, the reasons for hiring a PMC to train its 
security personnel or gain security consultancy while conducting business in conflict 
regions are different from the reasons of a national government, which might lack the 
inherent capability. Thus, different customers, like MNCs, can demand special 
requirements that a regular PMC does not have, and in turn, customers can investigate 
alternatives. This issue however would not endanger the power of existing companies 
against substitutes.  
6. Complements 
The talent pool of this segment, as in the previous one, is ex-military personnel, 
who offer the same or similar distinct advantages for the PMC. For example, the PMC 
can ascertain and benefit from the brand recognition provided by its employees. Singer 
states “MPRI [is] selling itself based on the past battlefield achievements of its 
employees while in the US armed forces.”192 The other example of how the complement 
affects the way of doing business is that the hierarchical structure of rank within the 
military has moved to the military consulting segment.193 This is highly important where 
the company in most cases tries to promote and establish a well-trained work force.  
These personnel help maintain close relationship with old colleagues still in 
service and this, in turn, provides the company with a flow of business recommendations 
and information.194 On the other hand, for instance, after being acquired by L-3 and 
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introduced to a larger array of clients, particularly in the corporate sector, MPRI requires 
less specialized military expertise, which diminishes the effects of the complement.195  
E. ANALYSIS OF MILITARY SUPPORT SEGMENT 
The military support segment is the most puzzling segment in the industry. 
Companies in this segment provide highly specialized services, are the largest in scope 
and revenue, and often appear less mercenary than the other segments.196 Although their 
employees may or may not have military experience or training, they have skills and 
abilities with military as well as civilian use.197  
The most common services include logistical support, transportation, 
engineering, construction, skilled and unskilled laborers, maintenance, 
technical expertise, and other paramilitary operations. They operate in a 
highly competitive global marketplace and adapt their products to meet 
market demands. PMCs choose their employers and the duties they will 
perform in accordance with company policy. They also utilize current 
business management philosophies, such as aggressive advertising and 
sales, outsourcing (subcontracting) of non-core functions where cost 
efficient, and controlled production and delivery systems to optimize 
profit. Although PMCs share many similar attributes, they can also differ 
significantly in organizational structure, source of working capital, number 
of employees, and other characteristics. Contractors perform a range of 
services from highly specialized tasks requiring extensive training and 
experience – computer networking abilities and communications systems, 
for example – to unskilled general labor in dining halls, laundry facilities, 
and construction projects. PMCs vary in size and structure from large 
multinational corporations with a complex hierarchical corporate structure 
to simple partnerships and individual proprietors.198  
They perform some other functions, such as personal protection, signal intercept, 
computer cracking, secure communications, or technical surveillance.199 As Avant notes, 
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They include decades old private security companies such as Pinkertons 
and Wackenhut as well as new firms in South Africa, the UK, the US, and 
all over Europe. For instance, the US hires DSL to guard some of it 
embassies abroad. DSL frequently provides site security and crime 
prevention services for the UN and many INGOs as well as to 
transnational corporations (TNCs) working in the world's hot spots. Gray 
Security provides site security to oil and diamond companies in Angola 
and Lifeguard Security offers similar services to diamond mines in Sierra 
Leone. Virtually all US contributions to international civilian police units 
in the 1990s were DynCorp employees.200 
To Singer, “Like what has occurred with supply-chain management in more 
general industry, the benefit of this type of military outsourcing is that these firms 
specialize in secondary tasks not part of the overall core-mission of the client’s 
organization. Thus, they are able to build capabilities and efficiencies that a client 
military cannot sustain. The client military, in turn, can concentrate on its primary 
business of fighting.”201 
Unlike the PMCs in other segments, companies in the military support segment 
can have large contracts, especially when supporting the operations of the most advanced 
militaries. These contracts are often of the cost-reimbursement type with indefinite-
delivery/indefinite-quantities,202 such as relatively long-term contracts including lifetime 
support contracts for highly technical weapons systems203 or contracts where mission 
requirements may change frequently and flexibility is required.204  
Lastly, an important feature of the segment, including its sub-segments, is that the 
operation areas and the buyers of the services are more numerous than the previous ones.  
Figure 7 illustrates the overall Five Forces analysis of the military support 
segment. Again, the dark arrows represent a relative assessment of each factor. 
                                                 
200  D. D. Avant, Private Security Companies, Vol. 10 (Abingdon, UK: Carfax, 2005), 125. 
201  Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Privatized Military Industry, 234. 
202  Ibid., 327. 
203  Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry, 155. 
204  Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Privatized Military Industry, 328. 
 58
 
Figure 7.   Five Forces Analysis of the Military Support Segment (After: Porter, 
M.E., Competitive Strategy: Techniques for Analyzing Industries and 
Competitors) 
 
1. Rivalry among Existing Competitors 
Most of the companies in the segment are simple partnerships and individual 
proprietors, or specialized subcontractors with a focus strategy (narrow strategic target), 
like AirScan,205 which provides day and night air surveillance to a variety of customers. 
On the other hand, there are broadly targeted large corporations, such as Brown & Root 
Services (Kellogg, Brown & Root, a subsidiary of Halliburton), DynCorp, and ICI 
Oregon. For instance, Brown & Root has roughly 20,000 employees and takes many 
different military roles, such as engineering, construction, base camp operations and 
maintenance, power generation, refueling, transportation services, and many others.206 
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The demand for their services has resulted in the expansion of established 
companies and the dawn of new ones. Being far more diversified gives many advantages 
to the companies and most of them can get a contract without any big challenge except 
for specific service areas, like the maintenance of some strategic weapons systems. Thus, 
the rivalry among the existing competitors is high in the segment and most of its sub-
segments.  
However, most of the contracts, especially those opened by state governments, are 
only for national companies and some of them are awarded as sole-source contracts that 
result in diminished competition. Avant notes, “In the lead up to the 2003 US war with 
Iraq, for instance, Kellogg, Brown, and Root (KBR) received an open-ended contract to 
restore Iraqi oil fields after the conflict without having to compete with any other entity. 
The rationale for the non-competitive process was a classified contingency plan for 
rebuilding Iraq's infrastructure, which stated that KBR was the only company with the 
skills, resources, and security clearance to do the job on short notice.” 207 The most 
important factor in this segment is that the services the clients are contracting for not only 
are important, but also often are crucial to their security. At the same time, the clients 
preserve a competitive market whose efficiency led them to outsource in the first 
place.208 
2.  Threat of New Entry 
Unlike the other segments, companies in this segment can get extremely lucrative 
contracts, and the lucrative nature of the segment attracts many companies. In addition, if 
the demand is so great, as in Iraq, there will be no competition and if one PMC wants a 
contract, it is easy to get one.209  
Although it is difficult to compete against the large competitors who achieved 
economies of scale and have high switching costs, many new companies can easily step 
into the segment by simply employing product differentiation.  
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Regardless of whether the demand in the segment is great, and whether the 
companies competing on the national or international basis, the overall threat of entry is 
high in almost all of the sub-segments.  
3.  Bargaining Power of Customers 
First, customers’ ability to influence competition among the companies grows 
when they purchase in large volumes. For example, Kellogg, Brown & Root (KBR), for 
its services in Iraq and Afghanistan earned over $11 billion from US government 
contracts from 2002 to July 2004.210 Although the US government has high bargaining 
power on the company, this dependency on privatization can result in the loss of 
expertise and capabilities, which can reduce its bargaining power.  
Second, the bargaining power can be lower if there are many customers. For 
instance, “Contractors [in Iraq] work for a number of governmental agencies and 
nongovernmental organizations with humanitarian and political, rather than military, 
priorities…”211 and “…many of the civilian contractors doing logistical and 
reconstruction work in Iraq have hired a PMC to provide protection for their 
personnel.”212 Thus, their collective bargaining power is low. 
Lastly, if their services are crucial as in the security sub-segment described 
previously, and the clients have little or no information, or do not have the ability to 
influence the market, the bargaining power of the customers can be low. However, the 
large customers, especially national militaries, MNCs, and some international 
organizations can turn to their in-house capabilities or can establish these kinds of 
services in-house. Thus, it can be argued that the overall bargaining power of the military 
support segment is moderate. 
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4.  Bargaining Power of Suppliers and Threat of Substitutes 
Because of the same or similar reasons to those previously discussed in the 
military consulting segment, the bargaining power of suppliers and threat of substitutes in 
this segment are low. 
5.  Complements 
Even though not every company in the segment uses the complement (ex-military 
and –security personnel), the security sub-segment alone uses them considerably, and the 
effect of these personnel is far different from the other segments. First, there is no 
existing company in the military provider segment in which they can serve; second, the 
military consulting segment is much smaller than the support segment considering the use 
of this complement. This issue is causing a drain on the regular military, for instance in 
the Iraq war. 
Deborah Avant argues, “in Iraq in May 2003 … security contractors have flooded 
the country. The unstable environment has stretched coalition forces thin, and the absence 
of a U.N. mandate has made tools such as U.N. peacekeepers and international civilian 
police unavailable, drawing private security companies closer to combat as the Iraqi 
insurgency continues.”213 Because of these,  
[t]he better paying PMCs are now competitors for the best military talent 
in their home nations, or even outside of it. Losses of trained military 
forces to contractors is increasingly becoming a serious issue, especially 
for the Special Forces community. The large training expenditure in 
money and time (four to ten years, depending on job, to achieve a 
competency) with many leaving early or at the ten and twenty year points, 
is often not being realized by the military. Highly trained soldiers are a 
problem to replace in a short time and it leaves those left behind over 
burdened.214 
“Competition over elite troops from private companies,” David Isenberg states, 
“is so intense that the U.S. Special Operations Command has formulated new pay, 
benefits, and educational incentives to try to retain them.” He also adds “To counter this 
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[lure of short-term contracts], the British Army is offering soldiers’ yearlong 
“sabbaticals” in an attempt to staunch the long-term damage being caused by troops 
leaving to take up private security work in Iraq. About 500 British soldiers a month are 
ending their military careers early. The Army, alarmed at the loss of some of its best men, 
has told soldiers that their jobs will be kept open for a year in the hope that they might 
consider returning.”215 
F. ANALYSIS OF NONMARKET ENVIRONMENT 
David Baron separates the environments in which a firm operates into market and 
nonmarket environments. “The market environment includes those interactions between 
the firm and other parties that are intermediated by markets or private agreements” and 
“the nonmarket environment includes those interactions that are intermediated by the 
public, stakeholders, government, the media, and public institutions.” Then he argues that 
the nonmarket strategy shapes the firm’s market environment.216 To Michael Watkins, 
strategic shaping of the external environment, corporate diplomacy, is a core function 
that he likens to international diplomacy.217  
To perform this diplomacy, Watkins enumerates seven key elements:218 
• Diagnosing external interdependencies – roles of outside players, such as 
industry segments, governments and their agencies, NGOs, and customers: 
It is clear that most of the companies in the private military industry have 
already defined these external interdependencies, particularly large 
companies. Although Five Forces analysis provides a comprehensive 
industry analysis to a company, it is important for a PMC to deal with its 
external environment. For example, on the one hand many PMCs try to get 
a contract from NGOs. On the other hand, NGOs can influence states and 
international organizations on the degree to which actions of PMCs may 
be seen as legitimate.219 It is also equally important considering the other 
interdependencies, such as the control and regulation of force in the  
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international community. Thus, if a PMC is to be successful, it should 
thoroughly diagnose its key external interdependencies and devise its 
plans. 
• Identifying key influence games – games the businesses must play and 
their implications: Watkins argues that, “Governments [and the UN in this 
industry] act as rule makers… They act as referees… [and] are 
players.”220 Then, he names two different categories of business games. 
Value-net games relate to the creation, modification, and preservation of 
contractual relationships among players in the company’s value-net, and 
public-interest games concern the rules governing the conduct of business. 
The value-net gives the company’s network of relationships with 
customers, suppliers, competitors, and complementors.221 As an example, 




Figure 8.   MPRI’s Value-Net (After: B. J. Nalebuff and A. M. Brandenburger, 
Co-Opetition) 
 
In this value-net, MPRI works with many national military forces to train their 
militaries. It also works with its weapon suppliers to familiarize itself with new 
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technology weapons. Furthermore, it maintains arms-length relations with US DoD, not 
only for new business opportunities but also to track skilled military personnel who are 
about to retire.  
By playing value-net games with others in its value-net, MPRI seeks to increase 
its bargaining power with respect to other players in the value-net. On the other hand, it 
also plays public-interest games to participate in the creation of, or at least to influence 
the regulations that can be set on national and international operations. Thus, it can avoid 
or reduce restrictions on its conduct imposed by regulatory authorities. For instance, it 
claims always to consult the US government before taking on a contract.222 In 2001, it 
also managed to get a license to train the military of Equatorial Guinea (with which the 
US had bad political relations). MPRI argued, “since the country was anyway going to 
get the training it was better to have US firms supplying it than anyone else.”223 
“Sandline, however, did not discuss its contract in PNG [Papua New Guinea] with the 
British government before it was signed. The regional tensions that resulted, particularly 
the Australian government's reaction, reportedly caused embarrassment in the UK.”224 
• Defining objectives – determining whether to pursue opportunities, defend 
against threats, or a combination of the two: The emergence of the 
industry undoubtedly proves that most of the companies in the industry 
have managed to identify opportunities to claim more value. In addition, 
either an individual company or the industry association, IPOA, first 
works to preserve the status quo as a PMC extends its area of practice, 
then to alter it in their favor, mostly on regulation and legitimatization.  
• Analyzing the players – the intended targets of influence, such as decision 
makers, opinion makers, and advisors: PMCs know that their first and 
foremost target of influence is the public, although governments and 
international organizations regulate their uses. Many companies in the 
industry have corporate websites on the Internet as an attempt to 
disassociate themselves from the mercenary label by keeping the public 
informed about their operations.  
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On the other hand, in the US, many companies are playing the lobbying game to 
influence the government.  
Employing mostly former senior government and military officers, the 
firms already enjoy broad familiarity with the government contracting 
process as well as informal connections with former colleagues and 
subordinates. But like any other mature industry, PMFs also feel they must 
employ lobbyists and make political campaign donations to stay ahead of 
each other. In 2001, ten leading private military firms spent more than $32 
million on lobbying, while they invested more than $12 million in political 
campaign donations. Among the leading donors were Halliburton, which 
gave more than $700,000 from 1999 to 2002, 95 percent to Republicans, 
and DynCorp, which gave more than $500,000, 72 percent to 
Republicans.225 
• Designing integrated influence campaigns – employing a mix of processes 
to achieve objectives, such as negotiation, coalition building, and public 
relations: These influence campaigns, especially coalition building, are 
evident when PMCs are used as foreign policy by proxy. In this fashion, 
both parties (government and PMC) can achieve their objectives. 
“Historically, PMCs have been used creatively by domicile states to 
enhance their foreign policy options. The symbiotic relationship between 
the United States government and its PMCs that we can observe today is 
certainly in this tradition.”226  
• Creating detailed process plans – detailed plans for influence process: 
These plans are used to successfully implement influence campaigns, and 
differ from company to company.  
• Building diplomatic capabilities – creating required structure and 
recruiting skilled personnel: PMCs are structured as typical firms and 
operate as businesses. Since they are businesses, they often have complex 
financial ties to other companies,227 and they require rapid responses to 
opportunities as well as crisis. To achieve developed organizational 
structures and skill sets, they are to recruit the best corporate staff. The 
corporate side of the company deals with these staff. However, in order to 
achieve comparative advantage against other companies, most of the 
PMCs recruit former personnel of national militaries; thus they can reduce 
the costs of training and maintain close relationships with former 
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colleagues who are still in the public sector.228 “It [this effort] also means 
putting in place coordination structures necessary to ensure that the 
company’s diplomats both understand strategic intent and have input into 
the formulation of strategy.”229 
G. CONCLUSION 
“The borders that experts in political science and international relations recognize 
are not the borders economists recognize. Instead, the boundaries that define the 
structures economists recognize are drawn by costs and benefits of the decision-making 
agent(s).”230  
Private military industry is an emerging industry with several segments. It is easy 
to add many new segments. However, to better understand the industry, three broad 
segments are helpful for researchers and outsiders. If a company wants to come into the 
industry, change its segment, or extend its base into other segments, it should consider 
the target segment most carefully. Although some elements are quite common in all 
segments like complements, others have different relative factors and leverages. Thus, a 
company should not take a factor for granted when planning to operate in another 
segment; even unanalyzed niche segments have their own unique dynamics.    
Furthermore, due to the nature of the industry many companies prefer to stay 
close to the decision-making process in their countries, thus creating business clusters. 
Then, they exploit the benefits of clustering even if they unknowingly establish them.  
It is clear how PMCs have evolved and provided services where the clients are 
often lacking capabilities or reluctant to struggle against privatization. The overall 
industry has unique advantages for PMCs, and many PMCs can compete when they 
consider the industry analysis. 
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Bearing this in mind, it is possible that there will be a broader private military 
service menu for clients to choose from in the future231 if the industry can maintain its 
innovativeness and overcome the problematic issues of regulation, ethics, legality, and 
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IV. LEGAL AND ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The private military industry, as described in the previous chapter, is highly 
fragmented. Many firms offer differentiated services to different kinds of clients. Though 
it is a lucrative industry for companies, the public domain in which they serve is one in 
which it is believed that the states should have a monopoly over the use of force. 
However, states no longer monopolize the exercise of military power; they no longer 
have total control over the power-violence agenda; and they have very limited, if any, 
control over the agendas of the PMCs.232  
The increased involvement of PMCs in the use of power has been associated with 
many problems. Among these are criminal activities, transparency, accountability, 
coordination, growing divergence in security policies,233 legal definition, and control and 
authority over the use of force. Deborah Kidwell summarizes some of the problems as 
follows: 
As profit-driven entities whose mission may derive from any conceivable 
source with funding, the services PMCs offer their clients do not 
necessarily derive from any compelling national or humanitarian interest. 
Only the written provisions of the contract define contractor 
responsibilities. These organizations are largely extralegal and are not 
bound or protected by the International Laws of War or typical rules of 
engagement. In fact, outspoken critics consider them to be simple 
mercenaries—warriors for hire outlawed by the Charter of the United 
Nations. Many PMCs frequently conduct operations in unstable, lawless 
situations and the old adage that power corrupts and absolute power 
corrupts absolutely can apply. In an unstable environment, PMCs are 
capable of becoming the law themselves. The extralegal status of these 
entities and other sovereignty questions have the potential to create 
international friction among allies and enemies alike, making joint and  
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multinational operations more difficult for regular forces. Moreover, 
PMCs may complicate civil conflicts by becoming just another belligerent 
party in an already complex security environment.234 
B. POLITIC IMPLICATIONS 
1.  Accountability: Legislations and Regulations 
Many scholars tend to equate mercenaries with PMCs. However, existing 
international provisions fail even to define mercenaries, and remain exceedingly ill 
equipped to regulate effectively the PMC activities.  
In his thesis, Judge Advocate Todd Millard examines in detail the international 
provisions that attempt to regulate mercenary activities, and names the following: the 
Hague Conventions of 1907; the Geneva Conventions of 1949; the UN Charter and 
related resolutions; Article 47 of Protocol I; the Organization of African Unity’s (OAU) 
declarations and conventions; the UN Mercenary Convention (International Convention 
Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries); and the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court.235 “Tragically,” he concludes “the elusive 
mercenary definition struggles even to reach the unaffiliated individual mercenary for 
which it was intended: a post-colonial rogue like Callan operating in 1976 Angola … 
[For] professional PMC services, the definition is nearly worthless.”236  
Other than the provisions regarding mercenarism, no other rules of international 
law that prohibit or limit (regulate) the activities of PMCs exists. Aside from the 
difficulties of applying international provisions, there is an additional problem of whether 
international law can apply to PMCs. The US and the UK, the countries in which most of 
the PMCs operate or are based, are either not parties to Article 47 of Protocol I and the 
International Convention, or have not ratified them.237  
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Enrique Bernales Ballesteros of Peru, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Mercenary 
Activities, argues that domestic and international law must deal with the issue. He 
suggests that there should be oversight, regulation and monitoring mechanisms that 
clearly differentiate these companies from participation in armed conflicts and from 
anything that could be considered intervention in matters of public order and security that 
are the exclusive responsibility of the State.238  
In 1997, the DSL firm had a contract with British Petroleum (BP) to ensure the 
protection of its pipelines in Colombia. In this instance, DSL employees trained a local 
military unit and reportedly fed the same unit with intelligence on local citizens who 
opposed BP’s project. With this information, the Colombian military through associated 
paramilitary groups committed unlawful acts against its own citizens. Again in Colombia, 
Airscan, providing aerial security and reconnaissance to help protect Occidental 
Petroleum and Ecopetrol coordinated an air strike carried out by national air force pilots 
that killed 18 civilians, including nine children by mistakenly targeting the wrong village. 
In neither case were employees held accountable or punished.239 
Due to lack of legislation both domestically and internationally, there are some 
quite striking examples on how some national and international courts ruled on the claims 
related to PMCs. For example, Papua New Guinea (PNG) argued that its 1997 contract 
with Sandline was illegal under its national constitution. However the International 
Tribunal, without questioning the legal status of Sandline under international law or the 
international legal validity of the contract and Sandline’s activities, concluded that since 
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own internal laws. In fact, the tribunal added that even if the contract was illegal under 
national law, this did not have any bearing on international law, because PNG was liable 
for the conduct of its officials who entered the agreement.240  
The other example is a lawsuit filed in July 2004 in the US, on behalf of several 
victims against CACI and Titan Companies for the abuses in Abu Ghraib prison. The 
plaintiffs asserted claims under the Alien Torts Claims Act (ATCA) of 1789, 
government-contracting laws, and other common laws of wrongful treatment and tort 
claims. The companies moved to dismiss the claims, arguing lack of jurisdiction and the 
non-applicability of the ATCA since it does not cover torture by non-state actors. The 
district court of the District of Colombia granted a motion to dismiss all of the claims in 
August 2005 on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction since CACI is incorporated in the 
Netherlands. Regarding the ATCA claim, the district court held that “although acts of 
torture violate international law, the latter does not reach private, nonstate conduct of this 
sort unless it is claimed that the private actors were acting ‘under the color of state 
authority’.”241 
The last example is the first case to reach the courts and become public against 
contractors in Iraq under the federal False Claims Act of the US. In 2004, Custer Battles, 
a Rhode Island-based company bribed a contracting officer to steer contracts its way. The 
contracting officer in early 2006 agreed to plead guilty to bribery and other charges.242 
On the other hand, a federal judge in Virginia ruled that the False Claim Act only protects 
the US government from fraud and in fact, it did not suffer any direct economic loss from 
this fraud. At first, the jury ruled that the company should pay triple damage for the $3 
million the company was paid. However, according to the judge’s ruling the company did 
not have to repay the $12 million243 (including the contract price) since the money came 
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from the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)  
and the judge could not establish the status of CPA as an instrumentality of the US.244   
The need for some type of regulatory framework became evident among the 
members of the industry, analysts, activists, and academics. It is argued that there are 
eight very important reasons why PMCs should be regulated: 
• to ensure they do not adversely impact on peace, security and 
conflict resolution; 
• to ensure that their use is both legal and legitimate and does not 
contravene human rights; 
• to ensure that they do not undermine government policy; 
• to prevent them from causing economic damage to their 
commercial clients; 
• to ensure that they are made accountable both for their actions and 
for those of their employees; 
• to make certain that they are as transparent as possible; 
• to prevent them from shifting between legal and illegal pursuits; 
and 
• to guarantee that they do not in any way undermine the sovereignty 
of states.245 
Such needs and the ambiguity in definition result in inadequately regulated 
private military industry, both nationally and internationally. To act on these 
assumptions, on the one hand, some countries completely restrict mercenary activities. 
On the other, a few others pass laws and regulations on the use of PMCs. These 
legislations usually take one of three forms within host countries: a complete ban upon 
any military activity other than in support of the country’s armed forces, regulation or 
complete prohibition of mercenary activity without any mention of PMC activities, and 
explicit regulation of PMC activity.246 
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Anna Leander compiled these regulation efforts of PMCs (in Western States she 
studied) into a table in relation to their services:247 
 
Table 5.   Regulation of Private Military Companies (From: Leander, A., 
Eroding State Authority? Private Military Companies and the 
Legitimate Use of Force) 
 
Nevertheless, the above examples indicate that there are still many gaps in the 
legislation efforts. Considering the US has explicitly regulated the PMCs’ activities, two 
of the lawsuits explained did not originate on behalf of the plaintiffs who were obviously 
ill treated.  
2. Sovereignty: Control and Authority over the Use of Force  
Janice Thomson articulates that states are sovereign externally since there is no 
higher authority in the international system, and internally because they monopolize the 
use of force and, therefore, political decision-making authority. Sovereignty has two 
dimensions; one is the claim to ultimate or final authority in a particular political space, 
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and the second is the specific set of authority claims made by a state over a range of 
activities within this space, meaning that it specifies the particular things over which the 
state claims to be ultimate authority.248 During the 1900s, states extended their claims of 
monopoly control to cover the international space. Then, at the same time, Thomson 
argues, states gave up their authority to buy violence in the international market and to 
exploit non-state coercive capabilities, and this trend is not obsolete.249 
In connection with sovereignty, Leander examines the impacts of PMCs on state 
authority. She considers these impacts in three ways: the direct effects, the indirect 
effects, and the diffuse effects as shown in Table 6.250  
 
Table 6.   Impacts of PMCs on Authority (From: Leander, A., Eroding State 
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The table gives brief results of her work. The first focus is on how the private 
military industry is affecting the authority inside the armed forces. She concludes that 
first, private actors gain authority in the armed forces, and second, the authority shifts 
linked to the privatization have been ill conceived and even more badly regulated.251  
Secondly, she looks at how the PMCs affect the state authority in the legitimate 
use of force in democratic polities. She argues first that by displacing the capacity to 
provide security beyond the control of state institutions, the public dependence on private 
actors diminishes the scope for authoritative decisions, and in addition, monitoring and 
control of their actions do not accompany the increased privatization and outsourcing. 
Second, by legal (lobbying) or illegal (corruption) means, the private industry tries to 
reshape the understanding of national security and the industry’s role in it. Finally, 
because the previous finding is so important for the industry, companies would pursue 
issues, ideas and criteria that confirm their authority in security matters, and would 
disregard or denigrate other ones.252 
In the international sphere, Leander concludes, “the development of a market for 
force diffuses authority of state and gives private firms direct control, by their direct 
impact on security understandings of governments and international institutions and by 
the diffuse impact it has on the faith placed in public and private actors.”253 Here another 
consequence occurs. Because one of the key reasons for claiming national authority over 
the use of force internationally is plausible deniability, a useful tool for policy-makers, 
when the states put the responsibility on private firms (plausibly denying state 
involvement), the plausibility of denial can be contested by other states and lead to 
conflicts. Then, the question of who actually has the authority to act in international 
politics is uncertain.254    
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C.  CONTRACTUAL PROBLEMS 
Many military support functions were and are contracted out for a long time. 
Contracting them out makes better sense for militaries in terms of both efficiency and 
mission accomplishment. Even though cost and quality problems frequently arise when 
the work is done in-house, when a contractor does it the same issues can occur. Singer 
highlights current and potential problems with the contractors. For example, when a 
principal (i.e., state) contracts out for services to an agent (PMC), the challenge of 
incomplete information always exists, and the agent can perform poorly or overcharge 
absent capacity when the principal lacks monitoring and oversight on the agent.255 For 
example, according to the General Accounting Office (GAO) of the US, due to the little 
control over the contractors’ actions during the 1995-2000 period in the Balkans, 
contractor misdemeanors such as over stuffing, over billing, over production, and cost 
overruns caused the loss of billions of dollars.256   
Another issue related to this is that some considerations, such as security, 
alliances, dependence on the original equipment manufacturer or a small number of 
companies with niche expertise require that contracts be awarded to national or regional 
PMCs. If the principal does not have enough options to choose from, then the 
competition may be limited, as may the quality of work. However, these problems are 
most likely to occur in military consulting and support segments. Given the previous 
successes of the companies in the military provider segment, it can be argued that this 
segment was not very prone to any failure.   
Relatively long contracts (i.e., lifetime support contracts for technological weapon 
systems) create an essential monopoly once signed, even if competitively bid. When 
PMCs have an incentive to lower initial bids, knowing they can negotiate during the 
contract period, then they can use this to stake a claim of their unique expertise. 
Dependence may result in a reduction in the client’s activity, especially for ones with 
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limited resources.257 The result is a serious of unique situations that makes efficient 
contracting based on precedent very difficult. That is, if incentives are too high, then the 
PMC can incur unnecessary costs.258 “The concern here is that profit-seeking contractors 
have scope for ‘ex-post rent extraction’ by exploiting uncertainties to increase the price 
of service delivery in ways not originally envisaged by the armed services at the 
contracting stage, thereby increasing the overall cost of service delivery.”259 
Because the PMCs are for-profit organizations, naturally they seek ways to 
increase their profits. Different from the public militaries, the PMCs limit their 
expenditure by trying to get solutions that are more effective to ensure their profit 
margins. They can even use other means, such as bribery, distorting actual costs and 
over-charging, under performing, etc. Furthermore, even if the contract terms are not 
achieved as desired by the client, if the funds to pay the PMC are not available, then there 
is little incentive for a PMC to prolong its obligations.  
In addition, although private military companies have shown a higher 
tolerance of casualties than UN forces, intolerable losses can also prompt 
premature departure, as in the case of GSG in Sierra Leone. Operations 
may therefore be cut short without regard for the consequences for 
stability. Conversely, it can be argued that a lucrative contract may itself 
act as an incentive to prolong violence and ensure larger payment. 
Fulfilling a contract successfully and quickly makes a security company 
redundant to its client.260 
As mostly cited, it is not clear that contracting out saves money, even though it is 
the major reason why PMCs have been seen as a cost saving measure. Besides, military 
provision might be more cost-effective for some functions where PMCs have incentives 
to behave opportunistically, future requirements are uncertain, and the number of 
potential external suppliers is small.261 To show that outsourcing can be costly, Avant 
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quotes that “A 1999 RAND report on privatizing the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps 
(ROTC) estimated that it would cost an additional $10,000/year/instructor to use 
contractors.”262  
Lastly, the industry personnel, mostly being ex-public servants, can make 
recommendations or influence policy to generate additional contracts from which their 
company or industry will benefit, which can raise ethical questions. Because many PMCs 
operate in the gray areas where interests are not so clear, they can cause private 
advantages, even unconsciously.263 This issue will be discussed with a different 
perspective in the next chapter. 
D. ETHICAL CONCERNS 
In fact, the undetermined definition of the industry, uncertainty as to where it 
belongs, and contractual problems are mostly (if not wholly) related with ethics. The 
domains of responsibility and accountability, which are believed to be the source of 
unethical behavior, are already discussed in previous sections. Therefore, following are 
some other concerns caused when PMCs are employed. 
It is argued that when humanitarian NGOs hire PMCs, the potential perception is 
that they have hired ‘mercenaries’. Furthermore, “[t]here is an implicit, and sometimes 
explicit, argument that all profit motivated organisations are by definition ‘unprincipled’, 
where as all not-for-profit organisations are on the contrary by definition ‘principled’. 
Public perception would deeply undermine the credibility of an agency connected with 
those events and claiming to be impartial.”264 This issue creates another dilemma for 
NGOs. They might be perceived as being a part of an armed organization or ‘the others’, 
which causes risk for NGOs. Such perceptions can significantly damage NGOs’ public 
images.  
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As profit-seeking organizations, PMCs directly benefit from the existence of war 
and suffering.265 Being private entities paid to provide services that the states 
traditionally are supposed to handle, it can be assumed that as a rule, they are more 
interested in doing as well as they are paid for than in doing good.266 For example, in 
1995, EO helped Sierra Leone’s army defend its capital, but later the company found the 
army unreliable in retaking the country’s diamond mines, which were key to its payment. 
The company turned instead to local militias and unintentionally created a parallel force, 
which led to a coup.267 
Another concern is that PMCs, in most cases, with direct market incentives can 
and do sell their services to whomever they desire, even to rogue clients. Even if building 
a brand name and creating a positive public image are the major drivers for the industry, 
when faced with competition, some companies may seek ways to differentiate and/or do 
anything for the right price against the norms that the industry tries to establish.  
The last troublesome point is the industry’s effect on public good, as security is  
outsourced to PMCs. Although economists seem to refer to security as a joint product of 
public and private goods, when it is a profit-driven exercise it has a potential risk to 
create commercial enclaves, from which the wealthy or a group are largely favored. For 
its protection, investment conglomerate Lonrho contracted with DSL during the 
Mozambique war, then switched to Nepalese Gurkhas from Gurkha Security Guards. The 
new protection with its 1,400-strong militia, watchtowers, and tanks provided great 
protection where the company was located, but the rest of the local society suffered from 
rebel attacks that shifted to less-protected areas.268 
E. CONCLUSION 
“Despite wide ranging concern … PMCs are a de facto extension of the foreign 
policy of their state of origin. They, in the main, offer a low-risk, low-cost, low-visibility 
way to exert military influence in a time of diminished budgets and shrinking armed 
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forces. Those entities that continue to exist in the ‘1960s and 1970s mercenary mould’ 
now seem to be under such close scrutiny that the various authorities often interdict their 
operations.”269   
“Even legitimized monopoly of force can corrupt, especially if there is no 
opportunity for recall, replacement, and substitution and no provision for latent 
complementary force… [T]here is potential for conflict between the agent … and the 
principal … on account of asymmetric information and agency costs (incentives to shirk, 
incentives to be corrupted, supervision and monitoring costs … and so on). In any event, 
a coercively financed public monopoly … can be complemented by private defensive and 
offensive security spending.”270 However, without legal consequences for any PMC 
activity, the public would continue to equate them to mercenaries, even if they claim to 
work only for legitimate customers and are closely scrutinized.  
In fact, in most cases PMCs are generally more effective than most of the clients’ 
in-house capabilities. They can offer a large, highly educated/trained personnel pool for 
nearly any given job. If their legal status, code of conduct, and ethics can be regulated, 
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V. USE OF PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
As Singer suggests, the history indicates that the private military actors will 
continue to play a significant and increasing role in the security environment, and as well 
as for its clients. Furthermore, the same structural conditions that led to the industry’s 
growth still exist,271 and factors that did not contribute to the bottom line are ideal 
candidates for its burgeoning. The industry is capable of utilizing its inherent capabilities, 
such as efficiency, effectiveness, and cost savings to provide services better than 
established militaries. Yet, the impediments of accountability and lack of legislation, both 
nationally and internationally lessen the exploitation of the industry for a good portion of 
the world.  
The high usage of British and American PMCs in Iraq has drawn public attention 
to the industry, along with many questions. Coalition forces benefit in many ways from 
the industry. On the other hand, not only are conflict zones like Iraq the industry’s 
playground, but domestic markets as well. Even though countless companies serving 
domestic military and security needs are not considered part of the industry, this is only 
because either the home countries do not involve themselves in any conflicts and wars to 
provide employment to them, or the companies prefer to be regarded as members of other 
industries for fear of being labeled as mercenaries.  
However, if the industry could be used under established norms and regulations, it 
would provide many opportunities for its members, clients, and even for third parties 
(such as the UN). This chapter shows how PMCs can be used economically if all the 
related problems of the industry (accountability and others) are solved. 
B. TRANSACTIONS-COST ECONOMICS OF PMCS 
In a competitive spot market, buyers are presumably aware of the hazards of the 
exchange. In other exchanges, contracts cover partially some of the hazards. “In the case 
of each agent agrees to limit the range of actions it might otherwise have, thus during 
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implementation individual incentives can be attenuated … [however,] In the extreme 
case, the hazards are so great that the costs of monitoring, enforcement, dispute 
resolution, and renegotiation (all transaction costs) can be minimized by integration of 
the parties, hence a hierarchy.”272 
Transactions-Cost Economics (TCE) is an approach to address the question of 
‘make-or-buy’ decisions. TCE answers the fundamental question of ‘Why do firms not 
individuals deal with each other through market transactions?’ The answer is simply 
because the firms in the market reduce the inherent transaction costs, some of which are 
uncertainty, asset specificity, frequency273 and probity274 of transactions.  
Transaction costs include the cost of designing and negotiating the contracts, and 
the ex-post implementation of contracts through to completion including monitoring, 
enforcement and settlement of disputes. Furthermore, transactions are presumed to be 
repeated, so that some costs that might occur (i.e., negotiation) might also be important in 
the future.275 Therefore, any increase of these increases overall costs, “including the costs 
of obtaining information, negotiating the terms of the transaction, and any re-negotiating 
necessitated by changing circumstances.”276 Although transaction costs relate to the non-
price costs of making a commercial exchange, they can eventually cause monetary losses. 
For example, in France 56% of defense procurement contracts are re-negotiated, and such 
re-negotiations cause an average price increase of 4.64% per contract, with some 
increases reaching 30%.277  
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Asset specificity is the transferability of assets that support a given 
transaction. Highly asset-specific investments (also called relationship-
specific investments) represent costs that have little or no value outside the 
exchange relationship. Asset specificity has already often been used to 
evaluate a choice of whether to perform a transaction or activity internally 
(vertically integrate) or in the market (outsource) … Uncertainty refers to 
the unanticipated changes in circumstances surrounding a transaction. This 
uncertainty could preclude both the formation of a contract ex ante and/or 
the ability to verify compliance ex post … The uncertainties increase the 
need to continually update contracts and costs of negotiations, in turn, the 
transaction costs are increased.278   
Frequency is the situation where the provision of a good or service is used. If a 
good or service is very rarely used, then the buyer would never want to integrate 
vertically. Lastly, probity is the loyalty and rectitude with which the transaction is 
discharged. Probity is especially used for sovereign transactions of public agencies.279 
Accordingly, transactions can be frequent or rare, have high or low uncertainty and 
probity, or involve specific or non-specific assets (ranging from highly asset specific to 
non-specific assets. Figure 9 captures the ‘make-or-buy’ decision criteria by using the 
TCE analysis.  
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Figure 9.   Make-or-Buy Decision 
 
1. TCE and the State Defense Activities 
After the Peace of Westphalia, national sovereignty has become crucial for the 
state, and defense activities seemed best conducted by a public agency. When describing 
the TCE of defense activities in this trend, Eric Fredland suggests that the costs of 
contracting out war-fighting capability are obvious. Then, he adds, although the 
transaction cost of the frequency imposes burden to the state, in fact it presumably has 
less relevance. On the other hand, the inevitable uncertainties that may greatly change the 
quantity of resources needed to accomplish an objective, and even the change of 
objective itself require that contracts not be drawn to cover all unforeseen contingencies. 
Military hardware as an asset specificity does not have value (with some exceptions) in 
alternative uses, and military training has little value in alternative uses. However, 
probity is crucial and “[f]ighting on behalf of the state belongs on any list of sovereign 
transactions.”280 According to Oliver Williamson sovereign transactions of the states 
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(foreign affairs, the military, foreign intelligence, managing the money supply and, 
possibly, the judiciary) are characterized by particular asset specificity and probity.281 
a. TCE and the Military Provider PMCs 
A contract between a state and a PMC involving combat support will 
inevitably be quite incomplete. As in PNG and the Sandline contract in 1997, the 
company should have information on the strength of the opposition to have a basis for 
negotiating the contract, and even with good information, unforeseen future events can 
occur and necessitate an expansion and/or different mix of resources (through re-
negotiation).282 
In the contract, Fredland argues, there was no language clearly explaining 
what ‘rendering the Bougainville Revolutionary Army militarily ineffective’ meant, 
leaving successful completion of part of the primary objective open to interpretation. The 
contract identified the payment based on the level of effort exerted by Sandline, not on 
the result, and commitment of additional resources required a contract amendment. The 
hazard of asset specificity was present in the contract, but the dependency was not 
symmetrically bilateral. The firm could threaten to walk away from the contract, might be 
able to find alternative employers of its military capabilities, would expect to re-negotiate 
the contract if the fight proved more difficult than expected, and in any case, the 
government was more vulnerable to hold-up283 than was the company. Furthermore, 
because the company had no loyalty to the PNG government and its leadership, the 
hazard of probity was high. Fredland concludes that, due to the degree of contractual 
hazard governments “would be best served by fighting their battles themselves.”284 
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On the other hand, because most of the time state militaries are in place 
but idle, being able to hire a PMC only when needed represents a significant saving for 
the state even if “[t]he hazard of probity may be as great or greater for an internal public 
force as compared with a private contractor.”285 
Countries like the UK and US that have many PMCs benefit from the 
contracts of PMCs with other clients. This is because firstly, the PMCs as a rule do not 
work against the interests of their home countries,286 and secondly, the PMCs can reduce 
the transaction costs of the home countries that they otherwise incur by using their own 
forces.287 However, the country (buyer) contracting with the PMCs is vulnerable to hold-
up due to asset specificity, and the probity hazard is obvious due to process integrity and 
loyalty considerations to the PMC’s home country. 
b.  TCE and the Military Consulting and Military Support PMCs 
Military consulting and military support PMCs do not clearly involve 
sovereign transactions.288 The frequency of the services used is much greater than the 
frequency of the requirement of military operations. Although the hazard of frequency 
depends on the requirement urgency of the state, it could be concluded as moderate or 
frequent. The country using this type of PMC faces less uncertainty of contractual hazard, 
thus less re-negotiation effort. Asset specificity hazard would be lower than with the use 
of a military provider PMC, because there would be more potential suppliers of the 
required services and timing (required time for the contract process) would not be a 
crucial consideration in most cases. In addition, the country would probably be able to 
produce these services in-house. The probity hazard too would be less because the home 
government’s national force, and not the service provider’s personnel, is required to be 
loyal and responsive to the buyer.289  
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Although it seems reasonable to buy from the market, buying these 
services (outsourcing) often requires extensive administrative and regulatory structures to 
oversee the delivery of services by PMCs, and thus involves a process of re-regulation.290 
Furthermore, numerous studies suggest that the potential for cost savings of contracting 
out these kinds of services is not easily achievable.291  
When a country uses its own PMCs to provide these services, asset 
specificity would not be an issue, because the country presumably has its own capability 
to provide the same services. The uncertainties in the contract between the PMC and the 
state could be higher if the state is paying the bill. However, it could be less when another 
country or organization is the contracting party and paying the bill,292 as in MPRI’s 
contract with the Bosnian Federation.293 However, a large probity hazard could appear 
for the home country. Because when a government uses a PMC as an extension of foreign 
policy, there could be collusion with the Legislature. On the other hand, for the home 
government contracts could be cheaper from the budgetary point of view.294  
2.  TCE and Other Buyers 
Military organizations are the prime example of hierarchical structure where 
transactions are more efficiently performed within the organization than through a 
market. By contrast, other actual and potential buyers of PMC services, mostly due to the 
lack of own security capability and its hierarchical structure need more coordination 
mechanisms to lower the transactions costs, with the exception of some international 
military alliances. Furthermore, because most of these buyers are inclined to use PMCs  
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internationally, “[t]esting transaction cost hypotheses in international relations is 
complicated by the vagueness of definitions of the concept, difficulty in measuring 
transaction costs, and problems of transaction cost estimation.”295 
Because most of the buyers are one-time buyers, the hazard of frequency is 
sometimes not relevant and at other times can range from occasional to rare. On the other 
hand, other transaction costs could be dramatically higher than with national militaries. 
The probity hazard of military operation services has significance on some of these 
buyers. First, it can be argued when some organizations such as the UN and international 
military alliances use the PMC services. PMCs could presumably have no loyalty to these 
organizations. In this instance, the probity hazard to the buyer would be at least the same 
or higher than the national militaries, since these kinds of buyers are seen mostly as the 
ultimate authority for implementation of the international rule of law. Second, probity 
requires process integrity, which could be diminished through non-compliant or 
adventurous activities of PMCs. Alternatively, in the case of contracting military 
consulting and support services, this hazard is not relevant for the buyer. 
Any analysis of the uncertainty hazard must recognize that some buyers “such as 
the UN and the African Union … are internally complex, and highly interpenetrated by 
their organizational environments, which consist largely of member states but also of 
NGOs, other intergovernmental organizations, and “global civil society” more 
generally.”296 Consequently, not having any previous experience with PMCs or in-house 
capability of the required service causes misunderstandings and disputes between the 
buyers and PMCs. Besides, the uncertainty about how to obtain the buyer’s requirement 
increases the hazard. However, a few MNCs could have some related capabilities, like a 
small security unit or some kinds of training, logistics units, etc. Then, for these buyers 
the uncertainty could be low or moderate depending on the required service.  
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When transactions involve highly specific assets, like special training, or 
equipment for interoperability (in the case of the UN and military alliances), transaction 
costs will likely tend to be high. Furthermore, the frequency of the requirement 
overwhelms this consideration to some degree.  
Although the range of the military consulting and support services other buyers 
require would generally be undersized when compared to the state militaries, the 
uncertainty hazard can be concluded as high. The reason is that these services are not 
daily undertakings for these buyers, and would possibly include requirement uncertainties 
and in turn re-negotiations of the contracts. On the other hand, if the transaction involves 
assets that are valuable in the context of the specific transaction, such as specially trained 
personnel and weapon systems for security, then the hazard of asset specificity can range 
from moderate to high. 
C. MAKE-OR-BUY 
The above potential use of PMCs for different types of buyers is discussed from 
the perspective of transaction cost economics. The TCE approach suggests that inevitable 
contractual hazards can limit the role of PMCs, despite potential savings. The findings for 
the buyers when deciding to provide their own services (vertically integrate or continue 
to use in-house capability) or buy through the market (outsource) are as follows: 
 
Table 7.   The Use of PMCs for Different Buyers 



































































































































































Table 7 suggests that contracting out operational capability to a PMC is not a 
favorable use for the state militaries mainly because of the sovereign transactions and the 
probity hazard; thus, it is better that the state militaries depend on their in-house 
capability.  
Although the table implies the possible use of a military provider PMC as a mix 
of vertical integration and outsourcing for all other buyers, each buyer should carefully 
decide on the issue. For example, the industry proponents argue that military provider 
PMCs might “have a role in enabling the UN to respond more rapidly and more 
effectively in crises.”297 However, the probity hazard discussed above limits this usage. 
On the other hand, presumably, most of the private entities and NGOs would not consider 
the vertical integration due to the frequency hazard. Besides, this type of requirement is 
so exceptional that buying this service through a market transaction is even a matter of 
dispute itself.  
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Fredland argues the use of other services by the states. “While war-fighting is 
sovereign, not all activities of military forces are obviously so, and the production of at 
least some inputs used to conduct defense activities does not involve sovereign 
transactions. National defense is very resource costly, so there is potential for large 
saving by taking advantage of the high-powered incentives residing in market 
transactions. Thus, despite uncertainty and asset specificity hazards, the production of 
defense hardware is contracted-out.”298 Although he considers only the use of military 
consulting and support PMCs by the states, it is also evident other buyers have equal or 
higher transaction costs, which result in a ‘to buy’ decision for these services. However, 
“[t]he simple fact that one can outsource does not always mean one should. Rather, each 
decision should be given due consideration and not be taken before a fully informed, risk-
based assessment.” Moreover, “[e]vidence suggest that carefully managed privatization 
can, under the right circumstances, provide specialized expertise, save money, and result 
in improved service delivery. It also shows, however, that poorly managed outsourcing, 
or privatization under the wrong circumstances, can lose money and result in poor 
delivery.”299 
On the other hand, TCE suggests that, apart from the probity hazard, asset 
specificity gives considerable rise to transaction costs depending upon the level of the 
specificity. This requires the continued production of highly specific assets in-house. 
“However, the cost associated with such specialization could lead to a special case of 
hybrid organization – the cooperation of rivals.”300 For example, ‘training’ as asset 
specificity could lead to hold-up problem. The trained military personnel (such as 
doctors, pilots, lawyers, etc.) could increase their returns in the market, even if their 
salaries are differentiated. In this case, the hazard would be low to some extent, because it 
would presumably mean that the same training could be bought through a market 
transaction. Thus, the ‘buy’ decision is prevalent, and “contracting for these services 
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where the period of time and services to be rendered can be easily specified.”301 
Conversely, if the required training has little to no value in the market (such as specific 
technical training), then, together with a ‘make’ decision, “[t]he argument extends, 
moreover to include hybrid modes – long-term contracts, franchising, joint ventures, and 
the like”302 and would carry hazard-premium303 (higher price) for the buyer.  
D. CONCLUSION 
The central feature of the TCE is the relation between outsourcing and the 
economics of contracting, and it suggests that firms or organizations are at equilibrium by 
maximizing their profits while minimizing their costs through the control of transaction 
costs. The variables used to characterize any transaction deal with the decisions about 
whether to integrate vertically or to produce in-house.  
The private military industry offers several advantages to the buyers, and the TCE 
analysis shows the potential areas of how to use them. However, as Fredland points out 
the belief that the use of PMCs could lessen the hazards of privatizing defense is doubtful 
and “[w]hile there are tasks that can be privatized, the uncertainties inherent in military 
situations make efficient contracting between the state and a PMC inevitably 
problematic.”304 As to the other buyers, “the transaction costs analysis shows that the 
costs of managing contracts, including arranging bids, monitoring outcomes, and taking 
legal action for contract failures, may offset any efficiency savings.”305 
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VI. ENTREPRENEURIAL ASPECTS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The study of entrepreneurship makes the understanding of the business landscape 
complete on collective theories of markets, firms, organizations, and change. The first 
reason for this assumption, as Shane and Venkataraman argue, is that entrepreneurship is 
a mechanism that helps society convert technical information into products and services. 
The second reason is its role of discovering and mitigating inefficiencies in an economy. 
Its role in driving the change process through innovation in products and processes is the 
last reason.306 Thus, to look at entrepreneurial aspects of the private military industry that 
have seen “the latest military innovation”307 would help to understand the mechanisms of 
the industry.  
B. ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND INNOVATION 
Two of the main discussions on entrepreneurship belong to Joseph A. Schumpeter 
and Israel Kirzner. According to Schumpeter, entrepreneurship is a theory of change and 
development. He describes development as “spontaneous and discontinuous change in 
the channels of flow, disturbance of equilibrium, which forever alters and displaces the 
equilibrium state previously existing.” He defines enterprise as the carrying out of new 
combinations to introduce a new good or method of service, new market, new sources of 
supplies, or new organization of an industry, and describes the person who carries out 
these functions as an entrepreneur.308  
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To Kirzner, this definition as well as many others has the element of alertness to 
opportunities,309 which consists “in the ability to notice without search opportunities that 
have been hitherto overlooked … [and] may also include the ability to notice 
opportunities for profitable deliberate search.”310 Thus, his ‘entrepreneurial discovery’ or 
‘entrepreneurial alertness’ complements Schumpeterian entrepreneurial macro 
development by demonstrating the alertness as the micro cause of market-based 
entrepreneurship.311 Kirzner adds that the grasping of opportunities that somehow 
escaped notice is to be seen as the entrepreneurial innovation.312 
On the other hand, Eckhardt and Shane put the entrepreneurship theory outside 
the equilibrium orientation that comprises much of the theory and perceives the 
“entrepreneurship as a function of the types of people engaged in entrepreneurial activity 
and, as a result, have largely overlooked the role of opportunities.”313 After discussing 
the limitations of the price system that in some situations provides insufficient 
information to allocate resources, they assert that efficiently guiding the resource 
allocation decision can be done through mechanisms other than optimization. Thus, 
“[e]ntrepreneurs bring new means-ends decision making frameworks into the price 
system by forming perceptions and beliefs about how to allocate resources better than 
they are currently allocated or would be allocated in the future on the basis of information 
not incorporated in prices.”314 In order to achieve entrepreneurial discovery, 
entrepreneurs should seek the opportunities that manifest themselves in three dimensions: 
“by the locus of the changes that generate the opportunity; by the source of the 
opportunities themselves; and by the initiator of the change.”315 
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C. OPPORTUNITIES AND THE PRIVATE MILITARY INDUSTRY 
1. The Locus of the Changes That Generate the Opportunity 
When a change occurs in products or services, entrepreneurial opportunities 
occur. According to Schumpeter, there are five different loci of these entrepreneurial 
opportunities. These are changes stemming from the creation of new products or services, 
the discovery of new geographical markets, the creation or discovery of new raw 
materials, new methods of production (or services), and new ways of organizing.316 
a. The Creation of a New Good or Service 
Assuming the private industry as free from any legal consideration and 
perception of being a mercenary activity, the industry is a newly created service for the 
needs of a variety of buyers. As Singer argues PMCs “represent the next evolution in the 
provision of military services by private actors, parallel to the development of the modern 
business organization.”317 Furthermore, entrepreneurs with military expertise caused the 
emergence of “the new business face of warfare”318 and with better prices and 
efficiencies, some military resources are currently available on the open market for even 
individual clients.319 
b.  The Discovery of New Geographical Markets 
Although the private military industry appears to be a global industry,320 
there is always a good chance of finding new markets. As discussed in previous chapters, 
most of the PMCs operate in conflict zones and wherever a conflict exists, the PMCs 
surface in those regions. Furthermore, “economically rich, but population poor states, 
such as those in the Persian Gulf, are able to reach power levels above what they would 
be able to do otherwise. The same holds true for new states (Croatia) or even nonstate 
groups (CARE), which used to lack the institutional support and expertise to build or 
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sustain a capable military force.”321 Even democratic states who are unaware of or 
unwilling to employ PMCs are new markets under the “’privatization revolution,’ which 
provided the logic, legitimacy, and models for the entrance of markets into formerly state 
domains.”322 
c.  The Creation or Discovery of New Raw Materials 
Simply because PMCs are service-oriented businesses, they do not create 
new raw materials. However, their ease of use and performance compared to state-owned 
and military alliance capabilities could be considered as the creation of new methods of 
serving, which is the next bullet. 
d.  The Creation or Discovery of New Methods of Production (or 
Performing Services) 
PMCs have diversified activities. They involve, 
in arms sales (Sandline), privatizations, financial investments, mining or 
the selling of raw materials (Executive Outcomes (EO) in Sierra Leone 
and Angola), oil extraction (Israeli PMC Lev’dan in the Republic of 
Congo), or the provision of services from medical assistance to transport, 
telecommunications (Geolink), assistance to rebuild industrial and 
agricultural sectors (EO) or to develop tourism (Denard’s SOGECOM), 
etc.323 
As such, PMCs provide new services for their clients who have previously 
never thought about them. For example, although the service is not new, they provide 
robust security that makes possible otherwise extremely risky investments for the clients. 
Singer calls these PMCs ‘investment enablers,’ which create local stability that reduces 
the costs of the client and increases the investment’s value. On the other hand, they could 
also provide services to MNCs, and humanitarian organizations, such as Worldvision in 
Sierra Leone and the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) (which 
hired PMCs for protection and security advisory on the Afghanistan border). Then, “the  
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firms create a counterpart to their help to multinational corporations, becoming here what 
one might consider “aid enablers.” Indications are that this client sector will boom in the 
very near future.”324  
They also help their clients extract their valuable resources safely in return 
or payments in oil or mining concessions. “The PMF … provides security to the 
government principal and its business ally's commercial operations. The government, in 
turn, provides the legitimacy, while the corporate entity provides the cash that indirectly 
pays the firm. As a consequence, the problem of securing destabilized regions becomes a 
viable business activity to the benefit of all parties.”325 Although this would normally be 
considered a beneficial agreement for the client who previously could not operate its 
resources to the degree it desired, the agreement made for present gain could disrupt the 
client’s future arrangements.  
Another innovation in PMC services is the use of their spin-off 
subsidiaries. According to Singer, EO is rumored to have been indirectly paid through 
mining concessions in Sierra Leone when its related companies had hired some of its 
original personnel to continue local security.326  
On the other hand, some companies also offer new capabilities. For 
example, according to its website Blackwater, a North Carolina based PMC, offers 
comprehensive professional security, peacekeeping, and stability training on its over 
6000 acres of private land where it has trained over 50,000 Law Enforcement, Military 
and civilian personnel to date. Furthermore, the company has a patent-pending target 
system for its ranges used in training, and an Armored Personnel Carrier that the 
company claims is the most protected carrier for urban combat environment.327  
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Dave Whyte states how governments are using PMCs in an innovative 
fashion,  
Historically, PMCs have been used creatively by domicile states to 
enhance their foreign policy options. The symbiotic relationship between 
the United States government and its PMCs that we can observe today is 
certainly in this tradition … It has been argued that the use of PMCs has 
allowed the United States government to claim neutrality, whilst 
simultaneously monitoring and retaining political influence in difficult-to-
reach territories.328 
The use of PMCs in this way by their home governments opens the way 
“for foreign policy by proxy -- where corporate entities do what the government 
cannot.”329 Thus, governments could avoid “the need for approval from legislatures, safe 
in the knowledge that involvement in or awareness of controversial military operations 
can be plausibly denied.”330 
e.  The Creation or Discovery of New Ways of Organizing 
First, as previously discussed, most of the PMCs do not have large 
numbers of employees and can limit their expenditures on fixed assets,331 and some of 
them are often no “more than a letterhead and a Rolodex file or database of willing 
employees.”332 The initial costs are limited to casual labor, an address, a list of names 
available and already trained, and some advertising.333 They are organized as little more 
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“[that do] not require bricks and mortar locations also generate opportunities for 
entrepreneurial profit.”334 Moreover, they have the ability to move across borders or 
transform themselves into spin-offs, wherever and whenever they choose.335 
Second, some companies with global brand names take advantage of 
smaller organizations once they gain entry into a local market. EO created a network of 
smaller firms specialized in different services. “Having seized local market share, these 
new firms would remain even after the original PMF's operations had ostensibly ended ... 
The result of this marriage of local specialization and transnational branding is a flexible 
network, loosely linking each new market into an overall corporate structure.”336 
Lastly, although it is a company’s preference rather than creation of a new 
way of organizing, a number of companies organize themselves to remain in highly 
specialized fields, such as de-mining companies Ronco and Minetech. That de-mining is 
considered acceptable helps companies disassociate themselves from the rest of the 
industry.337  
2. The Source of the Opportunities 
Eckhardt and Shane, relying on the studies of prior research in entrepreneurship, 
categorize opportunities by sources: differences between opportunities resulting from 
information asymmetries and opportunities resulting from exogenous shocks of new 
information, changes in supply and demand, differences between productivity enhancing 
and rent-seeking, and catalysts of change that generate opportunities.338 
a. Information Asymmetry  
Whether new information is available or not, it is clear that opportunities 
exist in both situations. For example, when the contract winner has been predetermined, 
there exists an information asymmetry between the competing companies. “This has 
reputedly happened with certain politically connected firms, such as with MPRI's gain of 
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the “Train and Equip” contract or Dyncorp's frequent U.S. State Department 
contracts.”339 Information asymmetry could also help PMCs if clients are willing to seek 
lower-cost methods than their in-house capabilities and lack the comparative data on 
alternatives. That the client requires the information in this case gives comparative 
advantage over the client’s in-house capability.  
b. Exogenous Shift-Based Opportunities  
Opportunities could result from external shifts in information, such as 
government actions or the creation of new knowledge. In the first case, government 
intervention by regulation or influence on the dynamics of industry by money supply, 
interest rates or other factors could shift the existing information.340 For instance, in the 
U.S., after the Gulf War ended, the Pentagon paid Brown & Root Services nearly $9 
million to study how PMCs could support American soldiers.341 This was the signal of 
the government’s purpose in employing PMCs, which shifted the emerging industry’s 
information and created opportunities. Another similar case related to government actions 
in the UK. The British Government’s response to the suggestions of Green Paper, 
‘Private Military Companies: Options for Regulation’ preferred the options “to be those 
involving the issue of a general license for companies supplemented by a licence for each 
contract. The licensing regime would be combined with the establishment of a voluntary 
code of conduct that companies would be requested to adhere to. This `soft-touch' 
regulatory mix is likely to prove highly advantageous for a state-corporate military 
alliance.”342 
In the second case, the US Federal Government created new knowledge by 
describing ‘commercial’ item definition and commercial acquisition practices. This 
nature of the new knowledge influenced the type and volume of opportunities, which 
“embraced and initiated—through legislative means—reformation of the acquisition 
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process,  including the passage of the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994, the 
Federal Acquisition Reform Act of 1995, and the Service Acquisition Reform Act of 
2003. All of the Acts (FASA, FARA, and SARA) created “commercial” buying practices 
aimed at garnering greater efficiency and effectiveness in the acquisition process, and 
eliciting greater participation in Federal acquisitions by non-traditional contractors.”343 
c. The State of Research Addressing Information Asymmetry-Based 
Opportunities 
In his book “Innovation and Entrepreneurship,” Peter Drucker discusses 
incongruities causing opportunities based on information asymmetries. One of them 
applicable to private military industry is the incongruity between perceived and actual 
customer values and expectations.344 The operations of EO in Angola, for instance, cost 
$60 million. When compared with prolonged unsuccessful battles of the larger and much 
more expensive Angolan Army, the company proved to be efficient and effective. 
Despite the ‘mercenary’ label, EO exploited the opportunity of its customer’s demand. 
Obviously, it was much less expensive and more affordable to the Angolan 
government345 and the incongruity was clearly visible to EO.  
Another incongruity could be in the rhythm or the logic of a key industry 
process, which might only be available to people within a given industry. For example, 
MPRI planned to tap into the US military market that opened up as the Pentagon 
downsized the military force.346 This was the result of two related factors. Firstly, MPRI 
employees, besides being new people of the industry, were former military; they were the 
former employees of the US military, which knew its requirements best. Secondly, they 
saw the opportunity that MPRI could fill in the training requirement gap with its 
collective experience.  
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d. Supply vs. Demand Side Changes 
Opportunities could also be classified based on whether the demand or the 
supply generates them. According to Schumpeter, as discussed earlier, changes in inputs, 
ways of organizing, production (service) processes, or product (service) itself could be a 
source of opportunity.347 On the other hand, to Kirzner, demand (customer preferences 
that influence the allocation of resources) could generate opportunities.348  
The end of the Cold War is a telling example of the shifts in both supply 
and demand. When the Berlin Wall fell, the half-century-long bi-polar global order 
changed. States downsized their surplus military power to reasonable levels. On the one 
side, unemployed, mostly young military personnel began new searches to continue their 
careers in similar fields, and ended up founding new security related companies. For 
example, in Russia, several new companies, having nearly 150,000 employees were 
founded to serve the international market.349 
On the other side, due to the lack of opponents and downsized numbers, 
military powers left their previously important territories, mostly in Africa. When the 
required stability in these countries could not be met with existing state militaries, they 
hired PMCs. However, two other factors contributed to the change of supply and demand 
equilibrium of PMCs. “The first factor comprises the broad transformations that have 
taken place in the nature of warfare itself. These have created new demands and new 
market opportunities for PMFs. The second factor is the “privatization revolution,” which 
provided the logic, legitimacy, and models for the entrance of markets into formerly state 
domains.”350 
Furthermore, for the developed countries the high intensity level of 
warfare requires advanced technology, and in turn specialized expertise. PMCs serve in 
those niche markets where states are reluctant to train their own personnel due to 
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economic considerations. In the case of underdeveloped countries, “[l]ow intensity 
conflict, primarily taking place in global areas of transition, has often lost its ideological 
motivations, and instead has become criminalized. In sum, warfare is undergoing several 
key transformations – diversification, technologization, civilianization, and 
criminalization – each of which creates opportunities for private firms to play increasing 
roles.”351 
As aforementioned, the US government’s new definition of commercial 
items, which includes services, is also a good example of the demand-side change. After 
legislation, the Pentagon has begun to demand more services, “from predominantly 
tangible goods and hardware to a near fifty-fifty mix of goods and services.”352 
The September 11 attacks have also increased the demand for PMCs. The 
opportunity was created when the increase in demand outpaced the supply of the existing 
companies. Following the attacks, the demand for their services expanded more quickly, 
and today, in the US, a number of vital tasks have been entrusted to PMCs.353 
e. Productivity-Enhancing vs. Rent-Seeking Opportunities 
Research on entrepreneurship mostly focuses on productive 
entrepreneurship, as the pursuit of opportunity makes economies more efficient. 
However, entrepreneurial actions could be private rent seeking. William J. Baumol 
defines rent seeking as “any activity whose objective is the acquisition of some monopoly 
profit or the economic rents currently generated or potentially available in the 
economy.”354 Activities such as litigation, takeovers, and tax evasion and avoidance, 
which could be innovative but do not contribute to the productive capacity of an  
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economy, are the primary examples of rent seeking.355 Thus, if an entrepreneurial activity 
shifts wealth from productivity enhancing activities to rent seeking, it would not be 
desirable to promote the interests of society.   
Although military activity is a prime outlet for entrepreneurial activity, 
rent seeking could happen in the use of military violence, which is itself an unproductive 
activity in economical terms.356 On the other hand, private military industry could 
worsen the situation. For example, in many failed countries, declining investment, 
production, and legitimacy or increased corruption lessen tax collection. The declining 
revenue leads to dependence both on external sources and on private sources, which 
might be offered together by PMCs. Consequently, while the industry could find new 
opportunities through rent-seeking activities, it could weaken the rule of law in the failed 
state.357 However, strong states with their better monitoring and sanctioning capacities 
“have mechanisms to extract revenue in a central tax system, an established system of 
contracting, and a variety of mechanisms to inhibit rent seeking by either the state or 
private agents.”358 
Furthermore, the fragmented structure of the private military industry 
creates excessive economic rent seeking for the clients with minimal financial resources. 
In addition, the presence of competition – allowing for outsourcing military activities to 
be beneficial – is not ensured when PMCs are used. This is the case for most NGOs.359 
3. The Initiator of the Change 
The activity of an actor that initiates the change could result in entrepreneurial 
opportunities, and the type of initiator could influence the process of discovery, as well as 
the value and duration of the opportunity. Non-commercial entities (such as NGOs), 
governments, existing and new commercial entities in an industry, their suppliers and 
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customers,360 and some exogenous shifts (such as the end of the Cold War era and the  
September 11 attacks) are the different types of actors. This classification of 
opportunities has already been discussed under different names in previous sections.  
D.  PATH-DEPENDENCE AND THE CASE OF BLACKWATER, USA 
1. Path Dependence 
In general terms, path dependence is defined “as a general property of complex 
dynamic systems, which implies that in a given explorative space it is impossible to know 
all the possible paths; moreover, it implies that every successive decision-making act—
whether it is carried out by an individual or an organization, or in the development of an 
institution—is dependent on the previously covered path, endogenous experience and 
feed-back.”361  
In a path-dependent process, choices made based on historical context could 
persist long after the conditions that created the dependence of economic outcomes on the 
path have changed. The features of path dependency could range from small-scale 
technical standards to large-scale institutions and the patterns of economic development. 
For example, the case of the ‘QWERTY’ standard typewriter and computer keyboard is a 
technical standard adopted globally. Another example is the path dependence in farmers’ 
choice of using integrated pest management (IPM). “To be practical, IPM must be used 
on the whole set of farms that are in proximity to each other. Where this set is large, the 
transaction costs of persuading all farmers to forego chemical methods often prevent 
adoption. In addition to these localized positive feedbacks, local learning effects also 
make the choice between systems path dependent.”362  
However, in some cases not all of the actions are path dependent in that firms 
have the ability to control the direction and outcome of the process. In other cases, the 
attempts of rival firms to promote their products and factors that are unforeseen or out of 
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their control could affect the process and create path dependence. This is the case with 
Microsoft’s application software for specific operating systems. On the one hand, many 
companies develop compatible products for Microsoft; on the other hand, some others 
compete to develop and introduce innovative products.363 
2. Blackwater, USA 
Blackwater, USA, based in Moyock, North Carolina, “gets its name from the 
covert missions undertaken by divers at night and from the peat-colored water common 
to the area.”364 For a logo, the company chose a bear claw, representing the large brown 
and black bear population in the area. Former Navy SEALs Gary Jackson and Erik Prince 
founded it in 1997 to build a first-class military training center, seeing that there was an 
opening for such a facility after the US military closed a number of its training centers. 
Eric Prince, one of the richest men to have ever served in the US military provided the 
financial backing and business insight needed to operate Blackwater. The company 
bought a large farmland in Camden and Currituck counties in North Carolina, 25 miles 
from Fort Bragg, a base for its personnel pool.365  
The company advertises itself as “the most comprehensive professional military, 
law enforcement, security, peacekeeping, and stability operations company in the 
world.”366 According to the company’s website, it is comprised of nine separate business 
units, and has relationships with its strategic partners, Aviation Worldwide Services and 
Greystone Ltd.:367  
• Blackwater Training Center, the largest private firearms and tactical 
training center in the US and the company’s original focus, 
• Blackwater Target Systems, a department offering shooting range target 
systems, 
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• Blackwater Security Consulting, a risk analysis and training service, 
which also supplies clients with mobile security teams of former members 
of special operations units,  
• Blackwater Canine, a dog-training unit,  
• Maritime Security, 
• Manufacturing of custom Armored Vehicles, 
• Parachute Jump Team, 
• Aviation, 
• Raven Development Group, an expanded service of building secure 
facilities.   
These business units have the following capabilities:368 
• A logistics operation that can deliver 100- and 200-ton self-contained 
humanitarian relief response packages, 
• A Florida aviation division with 26 different platforms, including 
helicopter gunships, Boeing 767, and even a Zeppelin, 
• The largest tactical driving track in the US, 
• A 20-acre manmade lake with shipping containers, 
• A K-9 training facility with 80 dog teams deployed around the world, 
• A 1,200-yard-long firing range, 
• A large private armory, including Berettas, Glocks and Sig Sauers, 
• An armored vehicle development program called the Grizzly. 
Blackwater spent its first three years struggling for an identity. It paid staff with 
an executive’s credit card.369 It opened the training center in 1998, but in early months 
had difficulty in finding business. Later,  
[t]he company became adept, however, at keeping tabs on national and 
international news, then adding facilities and training programs to meet 
perceived needs. For example, R.U. Ready High School was built after the 
1999 shootings at Columbine High School in Littleton, Colorado. It was 
essentially a two-story, 24-room, six-stairwell, all steel building that 
allowed for the use of live gunfire inside and even the use of explosives 
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for “dynamic entry” through the doors. R.U. Ready was used to teach law 
enforcement and military personnel special tactics ... The facility found a 
ready market; clients included a number of police officers who paid for the 
training out of their own pockets.370 
In 2000, after the terrorist attack on the destroyer USS Cole in Yemen, 
Blackwater found the opportunity to provide security for many clients.371 In response, it 
constructed a mockup of a Navy vessel. In 2002, Blackwater won a $35.7 million, five-
year contract with the US Navy to conduct two-week training sessions for 10,000 sailors 
“on topics that included sentry duty, weapons use aboard a ship, and how to board, seize, 
and search another ship.”372 
Its founder’s predictions on the military’s privatizing many traditional functions 
reserved for troops paid off in 2001. After the September 11 attacks, Blackwater “has 
seen its business boom – enough to warrant a major expansion of its training facility this 
year.”373 This led to a spike in business for Blackwater, and its training facilities found 
more use as it trained personnel for corporations, the US government, and the US 
military.374 As a result, Blackwater estimated 600 percent revenue growth for the next 
four years. While it was originally recruiting personnel from former SEALs, Green 
Berets, Army Rangers, and Delta Force Troops, after the Iraq War, the demand for 
personnel increased and in 2004 it recruited 60 former commandos of Chile’s military.  
Interestingly, it also found personnel from the Currituck County Sheriff’s office.375 
According to Time magazine, Blackwater’s official website claims “Blackwater has the 
people to execute any requirement.”376 
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As the company continued to see training as its core business function, in 2004 it 
made major upgrades to its facilities by receiving permission from Currituck County to 
expand its facilities into that county. New facilities include firearms ranges, parachute 
landing zones, and explosives training areas. Later, “Blackwater began to build a 
roadway through 90 acres of its property that would be suitable for training in high-speed 
chases (above 100 miles per hour) as well as motorcade protection against terrorist 
attacks.”377 
Jeremy Scahill claims that in June 2004, the US State Department awarded to 
Blackwater a $230 million contract, a “little-known [secretive] Worldwide Personnel 
Protective Service (WPPS) program, described in State Department documents as a 
government initiative to protect US officials as well as ‘certain foreign government high 
level officials whenever the need arises,’” but actually paid $320 million.378 
In the autumn of 2005, about 150 Blackwater employees were employed to assist 
the Hurricane Katrina relief efforts in New Orleans.379 According to a company press 
release dated September 1, 2005, Blackwater joined the ongoing relief effort by 
dispatching a SA-330J Puma helicopter to evacuate people from flooded areas. The 
company also provided airlift services, security services, communication support, crowd 
control, humanitarian support services, and logistics and transportation services.380 
“Unofficial reports claim that the company also provided law enforcement services, such 
as securing neighborhoods and confronting criminals.”381 In 2005, Blackwater also 
lobbied for Homeland Security contracts to train 2,000 new Border Patrol agents.382 
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In March 2006, Blackwater suggested at an international conference that a 
brigade-size force was ready to move into a troubled region for humanitarian efforts and 
low intensity conflicts.383  
In November 2006, the company announced its plans to open a new training site 
in Illinois, to be known as Blackwater North. It would have seven flat ranges, one each 
known- and unknown-distance ranges, and a climbing tower.384 
In 2007, during the State of the Union Speech, President Bush mentioned an 
initiative that would help the US forces in response, in reconstruction and in war: Civilian 
Reserve Corps. The proposed Corps was not his idea alone. Erik Prince, the mega-
millionaire owner of Blackwater had a privatized version of the concept. In early 2005, 
Prince announced the idea at a military conference of a ‘contractor brigade’ as an 
addition to the official military with a lower price tag.385   
3. Innovation, Path Dependence, and Blackwater 
The concept of path dependence suggests “minor accidental events can cause 
convergence towards sub-optimal equilibriums, and also explain … the way innovations 
spread.”386 The path taken by Blackwater depends on the context and coincidence 
whereby it is able to exploit new opportunities. 
Douglas J. Puffert states that “[t]he economics of path dependence tells us not 
only how history matters in allocation; it also tells us how, even more fundamentally, 
time matters.”387 For instance, the location decision of the company affected the 
subsequent course of allocation of its resources. The proximity of the location to a 
military base required that the company would maintain relations with its personnel pool. 
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Although it has diverse business units, its core capability remained the training service. 
Path dependence suggests that once Blackwater transferred enormous amounts of money 
to build up and improve its training facilities, it is often more costly to change the 
process. When the costs of change are large, it is possible that Blackwater would continue 
to use sub-optimal solutions, which is not the case for Blackwater up to now; rather, this 
entailed Blackwater’s continue spending on facilities. However, that this resulted more or 
less in a de facto industry standard contributed to its path dependence. 
Not all the decisions made by Blackwater are path dependent. It can be concluded 
that some of them were pure coincidence of opportunities (such as attacks on the USS 
Cole and World Trade Center), whereas a few others were the result of the company’s 
close relationships with the US government (Worldwide Personnel Protective Service 
(WPPS) program contract).  
In fact, path dependence analysis is generally used for technology related 
processes. However, Puffert asserts that, 
[p]ath-dependent processes of change in matters other than technology are 
also … the result of value-producing interactions among agents … Like 
path-dependent technological change, the evolution of institutions, 
organizations, and cultures surely depends on the pattern of interactions 
(i.e., the form or structure of social networks), the characteristics of 
innovative practices, foresight, switching costs, possibilities for 
internalizing external gains from switching, and other matters…388 
Furthermore, Blackwater somehow (exactly how is not clear in the light of 
existing literature) managed to combine already existing elements into its services to 
create new useful combinations. For instance, it recruited Chilean former commandos 
and trained them in its training center, thus it created a new force with Blackwater 
experience. Another example is the company’s Armored Vehicle engineering combining 
its capacity with real-world lessons learned on the operations.389 
                                                 
388  Puffert, Path Dependence, Network Form, and Technological Change, 27. 
389  Blackwater, USA Official Website. 
 114
The innovative characteristics in the way Blackwater exploited opportunities 
ensured no obstacle to the introduction of its services. As Scahill points out “Blackwater 
now envisions itself as the FedEx of defense and homeland security operations.”390 
E. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this chapter was to clarify the entrepreneurial processes in the 
private military industry. It mainly discussed the existence of entrepreneurial 
opportunities to the industry. Different PMCs unwittingly followed the opportunities to 
create a difference for their clients and to increase their profits. Whether they saw the 
opportunities or they simply followed the clear path, most of the PMCs exploited those 
opportunities. Thus, PMCs could be reasonably described as entrepreneurial. 
As mentioned earlier, entrepreneurship helps PMCs pursue new avenues in the 
conduct of private military services. The companies discovered that inefficiencies in the 
security environment have flooded into the industry. The gap in the market of security 
that revealed ‘the latest military innovation’ still has many areas waiting to be exploited 
by the companies. Consequently, entrepreneurship could represent an appropriate and 
reasonable position in any PMC’s competitive context. 
 
                                                 




Throughout history, soldiers for hire have always provided their skills in war 
fighting to customers who desired those skills. They have taken many different forms, 
ranging from individual soldiers to chartered companies. However, twentieth century 
introduced the new face of soldiers for hire, in the form of Private Military Companies. 
Although they have a lot of commonality with mercenaries, they differ in that they 
operate as established businesses. Chapter II gave the brief history of soldiers for hire and 
their evolution into PMCs. 
Money, the basic economic exchange medium, is always the primary objective in 
the conduct of their business. Thus, the economics of the new industry formed the main 
framework for this project. In Chapter III, an analysis of the industry was given in order 
to understand and exploit it. The chapter concluded that any given PMC should not 
assume its inherent dynamics to be profitable. Many PMCs have preferred to locate in 
business clusters to take advantage of clustering. Given the requirements of their services, 
the private military industry could expand its services into new areas, if the industry 
could maintain its innovativeness and overcome its challenging issues.  
Although it is a lucrative business and has many opportunities for the participants, 
several considerations facing the private military industry reduce its full-scale 
development. These concerns, regulation, ethics, legality, and political and social control 
of force were discussed in Chapter IV. Even if PMCs are generally more effective than 
most of the clients’ in-house capabilities, the lack of regulation lessens the accountability, 
an important factor that should keep the industry apart from the mercenaries.  
Chapter V tried to find the potential uses of PMCs in terms of TCE. Any 
transaction dealing with the integration or outsourcing of the industry players should 




integration or outsourcing could cause transaction cost burden on the players. In addition, 
TCE analysis showed that many costs inherent to transactions might offset the desired 
cost savings of outsourcing. 
Soldiers for hire were one of history’s first entrepreneurs. The new private 
military phenomenon carries on the same tradition. Chapter VI explored these 
entrepreneurial behaviors in the industry. Many exogenous shifts gave rise to the 
entrepreneurship aspects of the industry. Some of the PMCs have followed these 
opportunities as given while some others have sought opportunities to progress. The gap 
in the market offers many unexploited situations for PMCs, and PMCs seeking these 
opportunities could position themselves ahead of their competitors.  
B. SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Researchers in the field often lack comprehensive information on the industry. 
Before an actual implementation on the use of PMCs, further study and research is 
needed. Furthermore, some of the research and study could be independent; other 
portions should be conducted consecutively. Followings are some of the suggested 
research topics in the private military industry: 
• First, an advanced analysis defining the extent and classification of the 
industry is required. 
• Second, related to the first suggestion, an analysis of the ethical 
implications of PMC use should be carried out. 
• Third, to define the international status of the PMCs, analyses of the 
required revisions in international law or analyses toward helping 
construct new laws should be completed. Additionally, research on the 
revision of national laws should be conducted. 
• Fourth, a broader industry analysis covering all industry segments should 
be carried out. Then, profound segment analyses should be incorporated 
into the broad analysis. 
• Fifth, TCE should be studied for every client. 
• Sixth, case studies of some PMCs are required for the entrepreneurial 
aspects of the industry.  
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APPENDIX B   
Table 9.   Private Military Companies (After: SourceWatch Website) 
Name Abbreviation Origin Country Status 
Alerta Alerta Angola Undetermined 
Alpha 5 Alpha 5 Angola Active 
Mamboji Lda. Mamboji Angola Active 
Teleservices Teleservices Angola Active 
International Port Services Training Group, 
Ltd. IPSTG Australia Undetermined 
International Defence and Security 
Resources NV IDAS Belgium Active 
ATCO Frontec Corporation ATCO Frontec Canada Active 
Global Impact Global Impact Canada Active 
Globe Risk Holdings, Inc. Globe Risk Canada Active 
Atlantic Intelligence AI France Active 
Compagnie Internationale d'Assistance 
Specialisee CIAS France Undetermined 
Euro Risques International Consultants SA Eric SA France Undetermined 
PHL Consultants PHL Consultants France Defunct 
Secrets Secrets France Active 
Service and Security S&S France Active 
Beni Tal Beni Tal Israel Active 
International Security Consultants ISC Israel Undetermined 
Levdan, Ltd. Levdan Israel Undetermined 
Long Range Avionics Technologies, Ltd. LR Avionics Israel Active 
Silver Shadow Advanced Security Systems Silver Shadow Israel Undetermined 
Spearhead Ltd. Spearhead Israel Undetermined 
Strategic Consulting Group SCG Israel Defunct 
The Golan Group Golan Group Israel Active 
Satellite Protection Services SPS Netherlands Defunct 
Stanwest Establishment Stanwest Not Available Active 
Russian Military Brotherhood RMB Russian Federation Active 
Southern Cross Security SCS Sierra Leone Active 
Bridge Resources International BR International South Africa Undetermined 
Corporate Trading International CTI South Africa Undetermined 
Executive Outcomes EO South Africa Defunct 
Falconer Systems Falconer South Africa Undetermined 
LifeGuard Management LifeGuard South Africa Undetermined 
Longreach (Pty) Ltd. Longreach South Africa Defunct 
Military Technical Services MTS South Africa Undetermined 
Nicholas Frederick and Duncan, Ltd. NFD South Africa Active 
Omega Support, Ltd. Omega South Africa Undetermined 
Panasec Corporate Dynamics Panasec South Africa Undetermined 
Saracen International, Ltd. Saracen South Africa Active 
Stability Control Agencies Stabilco South Africa Defunct 
Saracen Uganda, Ltd. Saracen Uganda Uganda Active 
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Name Abbreviation Origin Country Status 
AMA Associates Limited AMA United Kingdom Active 
Control Risks Group, Ltd. CRG United Kingdom Active 
Defence Systems Limited DSL United Kingdom Active 
Global Contingency Projects Group Global CPG United Kingdom Active 
Global Development Four, Ltd. GD4 United Kingdom Active 
Global Marine Security Systems GMSS United Kingdom Active 
Global Risk Management (UK) Ltd. Global Risk (UK) United Kingdom Active 
Gurkha Security Guards, Ltd. Gurkhas United Kingdom Active 
Hart Group, Ltd. Hart Group United Kingdom Active 
J & F Security, Ltd. J & F United Kingdom Undetermined 
Kulinda Security Ltd. Kulinda United Kingdom Defunct 
Northbridge Services Group, Ltd. NSG United Kingdom Active 
Olive Security Limited Olive Security United Kingdom Active 
Rapport Research & Analysis, Ltd. Rapport United Kingdom Active 
Rubicon International Services, Ltd. Rubicon United Kingdom Active 
Sakina Security Services, Ltd. Sakina United Kingdom Defunct 
Saladin Security, Ltd. Saladin United Kingdom Active 
Sandline International Sandline United Kingdom Active 
Special Projects Services Ltd. Special Projects United Kingdom Undetermined 
Strategic Consulting International SCI United Kingdom Active 
TASK International, Ltd. TASK International United Kingdom Active 
The Surveillance Group Surveillance Group United Kingdom Active 
THULE Global Security International THULE United Kingdom Active 
Trident Maritime Trident United Kingdom Active 
Watchguard International Ltd. Watchguard United Kingdom Defunct 
AirScan, Inc. AirScan United States Active 
ArmorGroup ArmorGroup United States Active 
Aviation Development Corporation ADC United States Defunct 
Betac Corporation Betac United States Defunct 
Booz Allen Hamilton, Inc. Booz Allen United States Active 
Cubic Corporation Cubic United States Active 
DynCorp, Inc. DynCorp United States Active 
Eagle Aviation Services & Technology, Inc. EAST United States Active 
Executive Outcome, Inc. Executive Outcome United States Active 
Global Studies Group, Inc. GSG United States Active 
GlobalOptions, LLC GlobalOptions United States Active 
Gormly International Gormly United States Active 
International Charter Incorporated of 
Oregon ICI United States Active 
Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc. KBR United States Active 
Logicon, Inc. Logicon United States Active 
Military Professional Resources 
Incorporated MPRI United States Active 
Pacific Architects & Engineers, Inc. PAE United States Active 
Pistris, Inc. Pistris United States Active 
Sayeret Group, Inc. Sayeret Group United States Active 
Special Ops Associates SOA United States Active 
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Name Abbreviation Origin Country Status 
Trojan Securities International Trojan Securities United States Active 
U.S. Defense Systems USDS United States Active 
Vinnell Corporation Vinnell United States Active 
Wackenhut Corporation Wackenhut United States Active 
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